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Resumo 
Atualmente, é necessário que uma empresa se adapte rapidamente às 
mudanças do meio em que ela se insere. Neste sentido, fusões e aquisições podem 
funcionar como um instrumento chave para permitir que uma empresa atinja os seus 
objetivos estratégicos. Aplicando a metodologia de estudo de caso, iremos analisar 
a aquisição da Whole Foods Market pela Amazon (completada a 28 de Agosto de 
2017). Com um valor total de aproximadamente $13,57 mil milhões ($42,00 por ação 
da Whole Foods Market), este negócio destaca‐se como um dos maiores eventos de 
reestruturação empresarial desse ano, assim como a maior aquisição de um 
retalhista até à data. No presente estudo, pretendemos esclarecer os seguintes 
tópicos: (1) analise detalhada dos aspetos essenciais da aquisição; (2) quais os sinais 
que a aquisição nos transmite (tendo em consideração as mudanças nas preferências 
dos consumidores), e o que sinaliza em relação a futuros investimentos da Amazon. 
Resumidamente, concluímos que a aquisição da Whole Foods Market se adequa 
perfeitamente na estratégia da Amazon, permitindo‐lhe não apenas expandir as suas 
capacidades, mas também alargar o seu ecossistema. Por último, também 
defendemos que esta aquisição pode ser apenas o primeiro passo de um processo 
longo e dispendioso para a Amazon que, em caso de sucesso, pode suscitar ganhos 
significativos para a empresa. 
 
Palavras‐chave: Fusões e Aquisições (M&A); Amazon; Whole Foods Market. 
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Abstract 
Today’s environment requires that a company moves faster and responds 
quickly to its changes. In this sense, mergers and acquisitions can function as a 
powerful tool that allows a company to achieve its strategic goals. Here, applying a 
case study methodology, we will analyze Amazon.com’s acquisition of Whole Foods 
Market (completed on August 28th, 2017). With an estimated total consideration of 
approximately $13.57 billion ($42.00 per Whole Foods Market’s share), this deal 
positions itself as one of the biggest corporate restructuring events of that year, and 
as the largest acquisition of a brick‐to‐mortar retailer until the date. In this study, we 
hope to shed light on the following topics: (1) analyze the acquisition’s key aspects; 
(2) what signals does the acquisition sends to the market (taking into consideration 
the changes in the consumers’ preferences), and about Amazon’s future moves. In 
short, we concluded that the acquisition of Whole Foods Market perfectly fits in 
Amazon’s strategy, allowing it not only to empower its capabilities, but also to 
expand its ecosystem. On top of that, we also defend that this deal could be just the 
first step of a long and costly process to Amazon which, in case of success, can trigger 
substantial wealth‐increases to the company.  
 
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A); Amazon; Whole Foods Market. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Companies 
Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN; NAICS1 code: 518210) origins go back to Seattle, 
Washington, in the year of 1994. Under the name Cadabra Inc., a small company 
started its activity by selling books online. Today, it is considered the number one 
retailer in the world. At the beginning of 2018, the e‐commerce giant is responsible 
for around 18% of the online grocery sales in the United States2. One of the principles 
that guide Amazon is customer obsession (rather than competitor focus), betting on 
the convenience and on offering the best prices. In fact, one of the factors that 
contributed to Amazon’s success was the short time window between the ordering 
and delivery of its products – achieved through several warehouses strategically 
located across the United States. Further, the company is known for its focus on the 
long‐term. Jeff Bezos, founder, chairman, president and CEO of Amazon, frequently 
highlights that his focus is primarily to invest in other platforms and products, 
having in mind the market share expansion, and long‐term value creation.  
Amazon’s goal to be the “only” company that you need becomes every day 
more close to reality (even the arrow in the logo of the company, connecting the 
letter “A” to the letter “Z” sends the message that they are able to fulfill all our 
demands). Together with the expansion of its geographical reach, the company 
continues to diversify its “basket” of products/services. Shortly, these can be divided 
between: Online Shopping (currently Amazon’s biggest source of revenue; Amazon 
continuously expands its online offerings through the acquisition of small online 
                                                           
1 North American Industry Classification System; a standard used by Federal statistical agencies to classify 
business establishments. 
2 According to One Click Retail. 
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businesses, ranging from clothes to medication)3; Physical Stores (apart from the 
Whole Foods Market’s stores, Amazon also possesses bookstores, pop‐up stores, 
and some cashier‐less convenience stores); Web Services (Amazon’s fastest growing 
segment, providing cloud services to several companies and government agencies); 
Advertising (currently the biggest percentage of “Other Revenues” of its financial 
statements); Subscriptions (in 2018, Amazon reached the mark of 100 million Prime 
Member subscribers worldwide, generating billions of dollars annually); Hollywood 
Studio (Amazon started producing its own content for Prime Video platform); 
Amazon’s Private Label Bands Video Games, Audiobooks, Streaming Services; and Gadgets. 
Among these, we highlight Amazon’s loyalty program (Amazon Prime 
membership). Despite the rise of its annuity, on May 2018, from $99 to $119, the 
number of subscribers continues to increase. Through it, Prime members can have 
access to unique products/services, as well as special discounts, such as unique deals 
on Amazon’s Prime Day4.  
Whole Foods Market, Inc. (WFM; NAICS code: 445110) was originated from 
the consolidation between Safer Way Natural Foods and Clarksville Natural 
Grocery, in 1980. Based in Austin, Texas, WFM was the first supermarket chain to 
successfully sell natural and organic food on a large scale (also the first “Certified 
Organic” grocer in the U.S.)5. Its motto, “Whole Foods, Whole People, Whole 
Planet”, perfectly expresses how the company is managed. With its value‐driven 
management style, it was able to attract and retain a considerable number of 
                                                           
3 More, Amazon offers programs that empower other small online businesses, enabling them to sell their 
products on its Websites and their own branded Websites. 
4 According to Amazon, Prime Member subscriptions tend to escalate, during this period. To our interest, the 
year after the acquisition, marked the first time WFM’s products and stores become part of the set of 
opportunities of Amazon’s Prime Day. For more details about Amazon’s Prime Day, please see 
https://www.amazon.com/primeinsider/tips/get‐ready‐prime‐day.html  
5 At the time of the acquisition, WFM’s possessed physical stores across the U.S., U.K, and Canada. However, in 
this study, we will only focus our attention on the implications of the acquisition on its stores located in the U.S. 
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customers. More precisely, the idea of a farmer‐friendly brand that offers healthier 
products for its consumers, allowed them to gain market share and establish 
themselves as one of the top grocery chains in the U.S. Other strand that always was 
a concern for WFM was the common welfare. Their foundation, Whole Planet 
Foundation, is just one example of their commitment in this regard6. 
However, the recent past brought several problems for the company. The 
nickname “Whole Paycheck” (given by social media, due to the superior prices 
practiced by the company) was causing severe damages to the company’s brand7. 
On top of that, the company was not succeeding at giving a response to the 
increasing competition, which resulted into a loss of market share. In terms of 
performance, WFM was also struggling. Since 2015, its sales were almost flat and 
the “bottom line” of its financial statements was leaving its investors more 
concerned8.  
1.2. Details about the Acquisition 
Today, M&As are an important part of Amazon’s growth strategy, allowing 
it both to reinforce its position in industries in which the company was already 
operating and to expand its presence across new ones9, and to acquire 
complementary capabilities (filling the gap in its existing ones). To our interest10, the 
acquisition of WFM, in 2017, gave Amazon instant access to 2% of the $600 billion‐
a‐year American grocery market. On top of that, through the deal, Amazon would 
have its first experience, on a large scale, with “offline” retail. This key aspect would 
                                                           
6 For more detail, please see https://www.wholeplanetfoundation.org/  
7 Despite the company’s efforts to cut cost, and offer its products at a competitive price, the nickname continued 
to be present in the people’s minds. 
8 In order to complement the reader’s comprehension about our analysis, in Annex – 1. Whole Foods Market’s and 
Amazon’s financial statements, we provide both companies’ financial statements (standardized), as well as some 
additional information. 
9 See Annex – 2. Amazon’s M&A deals. 
10 See Appendix – 1. Summary of the acquisition’s key aspects. 
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give the online giant the possibility to enlarge its distribution channels and to better 
understand customers’ in‐store behavior. 
During the months preceding the announcement of the acquisition, it is 
possible to identify some “red‐flags” in WFM’s financials. In a few words, we 
emphasize the fact that, in terms of profitability, the company was performing 
considerably worse than its peers. Moreover, a majority of WFM’s key indicators 
(such as “Same‐Store Sales”) presented significant negative variation, when 
compared to the same period of the previous year11. These factors also might have 
served as basis for the activism conducted by Jana Partners LLC. On April 20th, 2017, 
the hedge‐fund filed a Schedule 13D with the SEC disclosing that they had acquired 
approximately 8.3% of WFM’s outstanding common stock, and that they intended 
to engage in active discussions with WFM12. 
By analyzing the definitive proxy statement we learn that the first contacts 
received/initiated by WFM in order to engage in a corporate restructuring operation 
go back to two months prior to the public announcement of Amazon’s offer. 
Contrary to public knowledge at the time of the announcement, throughout this time 
window, apart from negotiations with Amazon13, WFM also received separate 
inquiries, from four private equity firms and from two companies. The truth is that 
Amazon’s proposal was superior to those from its competitor bidders. Its “deep 
pockets”, allied with the complementarity in both capabilities and segments, 
positioned the company as the best alternative to reverse WFM’s negative trend and 
to create more value14. As a result, the total consideration of Amazon’s offer ($42.00 
                                                           
11 These analysis is helpful to understand why WFM was an attractive target to Amazon. 
12 We consider this moment to be the beginning of the actions that lead to the acquisition of WFM by Amazon. 
13 On May 23rd, 2017, Amazon offered to pay $41.00 per WFM’s share. As a response, WFM asked for $45.00 per 
share. Despite the rejection of this counterproposal, the online giant raised its offer to $42.00 (non‐negotiable), 
implying a premium of 17.61% (comparing to WFM’s stock price as in the first contact with Amazon). 
14 Our case constitutes an example of mutual choice in M&A. John Mackey (WFM’s CEO at the time of the deal) 
even stated that the possibility of a merger with Amazon was “love at first sight”. 
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per share) was estimated to be approximately $13.57 billion (including WFM’s long‐
term debt and Amazon’s total fee paid15, the acquisition’s total purchase price sums 
approximately $14.76 billion).  
Amazon opted for paying the deal entirely with cash. In conformity, in order 
to finance the deal, the company decided to enter into a commitment letter with 
Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Goldman Sachs Lending Partners LLC, Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, and Bank of America, N.A., to obtain a 364‐
day senior unsecured bridge term loan, summing a principal amount of $13.7 billion, 
providing the desired speed and flexibility to complete the deal. Next, to fulfill its 
responsibilities towards the initial financing, Amazon choose to sell debt, totaling 
$16 billion across seven tranches. 
Changing the subject, from the market’s reaction to the announcement of the 
deal, it is possible to conclude that investors perceived Amazon’s acquisition as 
good news. In more detail, on June 16th, 2017, both WFM’s and Amazon’s stock 
prices rose 25.54% and 2.41%, respectively16. In other words, by analyzing both 
parties’ stock prices it is possible to conclude that investors were anticipating 
significant synergetic gains from the acquisition17. Complementarily, in order to 
fully assess the market’s reaction to the announcement of the deal, we also examined 
its impact on WFM’s competitors’ stock prices. In this sense, on June 16th, other 
                                                           
15 Relating to the deal, Amazon paid a total fee equal to $25.704 million, while WFM paid a total fee equal to $45 
million (0.19% and 0.33%, respectively, comparing to the total consideration). 
16 Generating an abnormal‐return of 25.62% and 2.79%, respectively. Further, considering the time window from 
10 trading‐days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to 10 trading‐days after the announcement, the 
acquisition generated a cumulative‐abnormal‐return of 18.85% and 0.42% to WFM and Amazon, respectively. 
17 Following Bruner (2004), “true synergies create value for shareholders by harvesting benefits from merger that 
they would be unable to gain on their own”. 
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retailers, such as Walmart, Target and Sprouts Farmers, experienced significant 
negative returns (‐4.76%, ‐5.28%, and ‐6.50%, respectively)18. 
 With the end of incorporating WFM into Amazon’s ecosystem, the organic‐
food chain merged with Walnut Merger Sub, Inc. (an indirect wholly owned 
subsidiary of Amazon which, apart from its formation and the activity related to the 
acquisition, did not had any other activities), in an operation denominated by 
reverse triangular merger. In more detail, the organic food chain merged with 
Walnut (the special‐purpose‐vehicle) and continued to exist. As a result of this 
operation, WFM became a subsidiary to Amazon19. The company continued to 
operate its stores under WFM’s name/brand, and John Mackey maintained his 
functions. Conversely, individuals holding positions as directors of Merger Sub at 
the effective time would become the initial directors of the surviving corporation. 
 
1.3. Literature related to the Acquisition 
Other researchers have already analyzed the acquisition that we propose here 
to study. Nadar (2018), combines a qualitative and quantitative analysis in order to 
better understand the “abnormal” movement in the stock prices of the two 
companies. At the announcement, both companies’ stock prices rose. According to 
the majority of the literature in this regard, it is not usual that acquirer’s shareholders 
react in such a positive way to news concerning an acquisition (i.e. many times, 
acquirer’s shareholders show some skepticism about initiating an acquisition, 
leading to a decline in the acquirer’s share price). On the other hand, target’s 
shareholders generally perceive an acquisition as good news for the company. The 
                                                           
18 The acquisition came at the same time as other important news to the food retail sector. The entrance of German 
retail giant Lidl in the U.S., and the alarms sent by the Kroger’s profits turn the response by the markets very 
sensitive to adverse news. 
19 After the acquisition, WFM was delisted from NASDAQ and deregistered under the Exchange Act. 
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main conclusion of his paper was that, regardless the two companies’ (combined) 
future performance, the deal would provide very useful data (not only for Amazon, 
but for the market too)20. 
 Additionally, an article of the Journal of Marketing Development and 
Competitiveness, explores the problems that affected WFM in the recent years, a 
company considered by them to have a distinct value‐driven management21. These 
insights are helpful to our analysis, given that they point out which areas might be 
crucial for Amazon to intervene. WFM’s core problems indicated by them were 
related to the loss of consumers’ trust and loyalty. More, the PETA lawsuit imposed 
to the company in 2016, and the scandals related to mislabeling weights on their 
products were also contributing to WFM’s brand deterioration. As a result, many 
started questioning if the “premium” paid for WFM’s products was really worth it. 
 An alternative approach can be found on the work conducted by Philips‐
Connolly and Connolly (2017). The researchers analyze what implications the 
entrance of Amazon on this industry could have to “Big Food”22 chains. They argue 
that the consumers’ preferences are changing towards local, organic and less 
processed food, and that the traditional grocery store model is becoming obsolete. 
They conclude that the entire value chain of the food industry is going through some 
profound changes, and that the announcement of the deal made the alarms sound 
for “Big Food” firms. These companies have already started to react. Namely, some 
are adjusting their recipes, buying organic products from small producers, creating 
brands more “natural” and “healthy”, among other actions.  
                                                           
20 Nadar (2018), also computes a valuation of WFM. Following his valuation, WFM were undervalued at the time 
of the deal ‐ $37.78 per share, implying a premium of 11.17%. 
21 See Cheretis and Mujtaba (2014). 
22 Term used to designate large industrial food producers and manufacturers. 
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1.4. Research Questions and Methodology 
In this study, combining a qualitative and quantitative analysis, we propose 
to study Amazon’s acquisition of WFM, from the time that preceded the 
announcement, to the integration process23. In this study, we hope to shed light on 
the following topics: (1) analyze the acquisition’s key aspects; (2) what signals does 
the acquisition sends to the market (taking into consideration the changes in the 
consumers’ preferences), and about Amazon’s future moves. 
Given the complexity of the questions, our approach was a case study 
methodology. As it is defended by Bruner (2004), this methodology is useful to study 
M&A deals. He argues that the adoption of a deterministic logic to understand M&A 
does not allow a fruitful description of a particular event. To answer our research 
questions, we gathered information from SEC fillings concerning the acquisition, 
from several news/articles about the takeover (from the date of the public 
announcement, until the beginning of 2019), and from the two companies’ financial 
statements. 
 
1.5. How the paper is organized 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2. we will 
present a literature review that allows us to better understand M&A activity and 
some practices associated with achieving success through it. In section 3. we will 
briefly describe the methodology and data used to answer our research questions. 
Section 4. is reserved for the analysis of the key aspects of the acquisition. In Section 
5. we will present a critical analysis of the deal. Section 6. concludes.  
                                                           
23 Despite the complementarity between the legal, tax and accounting, and financial considerations, in this study, 
we will focus mainly on analyzing Amazon’s acquisition from a financial perspective. 
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2. Literature Review 
In the United States, the ownership and management of a company, by rule, 
is separated. In this context, shareholders vote for the board of directors, hoping that 
they will guarantee that managers will act according to their interests24. In the real 
world, the internal control devices that a company uses to impede its managers from 
taking non‐value‐maximizing operations might not be effective. On the same line of 
thought, many argue that agency problems cannot be avoid. In this context, the stock 
market performs an essential role in monitoring/discipline managers’ actions. 
Moreover, managers need to have discretion to react to unanticipated events. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) defend that the best option is to protect investors’ rights 
and try to align interests through an efficient executive compensation plan25. The 
competition to determine who has the right to manage a company’s resources plays 
an important role in limiting the divergences from shareholders’ interests (i.e. the 
maximization of shareholder value). Jensen and Ruback (1983), perceive “competing 
management teams as primary activists entities, with stockholders (including 
institutions) playing a relatively passive, but fundamentally important, judicial 
role”. More, the stockholders focus on the highest dollar value proposals, even if this 
means the removal of the incumbent management26. Many incumbent managers 
decide to implement a set of defense mechanisms as a response to the threat to their 
seats. These defenses can affect the company’s value, and range from golden‐
parachutes, staggered boards, super‐majority clauses, poison‐pills, to a set of actions 
taken as a direct response to an offer, such as repurchases of voting‐securities, 
                                                           
24 In the U.S., corporation law imposes managers a fiduciary duty managers towards the shareholders. 
25 Proxy fights – attempt to obtain enough proxies to obtain control – are another (yet more costly) way that can 
be used by a company’s shareholder to remove incumbent managers. 
26 Lehn and Zhao (2006) provide evidence that “managers who make value‐reducing acquisitions face a 
significant higher probability of being replaced (…) than managers who make value‐enhancing acquisitions, 
either by internal governance, takeovers, or bankruptcy.” 
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divestitures, issuances, and antitrust obstacles27. The authors also defend that 
managerial actions related to corporate control usually bring value to the 
stockholders. Similarly, Hanouna et al. (2001) concluded that the market values 
control – the direct power to cause more than 50% of the existing shareholder votes 
to be cast in the same manner – providing evidence that the median control premium 
paid for majority and comparable minority transactions is approximately 30% (in 
the U.S.).  
In reality, the transference of control allows to “unlock” resources that might 
be inefficiently managed. Over the past century, there are several factors that 
contributed to the enhancement of the M&A activity in the United States, such as 
innovations in terms of financing, deregulation, weakening of some state 
antitakeover regulation, etc. Moreover, one important aspect that contributed for its 
development was the increasingly positive perception about these operations (i.e. 
the acknowledgement of its potential returns). Companies and investors are 
increasing their confidence in M&A. Nowadays, companies have really robust 
strategies to approach these operations, and their valuations and due diligence 
process go far behind the possible risks and financial perspective. By looking at the 
past decade, it is clear that acquirers are more selective about their targets. Also, 
companies are getting better at doing integration, which allows them to create more 
value to their stakeholders. McKinsey & Company stated on a report that “since 
2010, more than 50% of all deals have left the acquiring and acquired companies 
worth more together than they were apart” and that acquirers “are at least no longer 
destroying value”.  
                                                           
27 Concerning its implementation, we can highlight two strands: the “managerial entrenchment hypothesis” – 
its implementation might result into an entrenchment of the current management or even deviate any offer that 
might be beneficial for the company –, and the “stockholder interests hypothesis” – its implementation can 
overthrow an inadequate offer either from the initial bidder or by leading to an auction. For more details about 
this topic, please see DeAngelo and Rice (1983); Comment and Schwert (1995); and Stout (2002). 
11 
Many companies integrate M&As as part of their growth strategy 
(particularly larger firms, according to McKinsey the vast majority of world largest 
companies use active M&A programs). However, the decision to engage into an 
acquisition can have multiple origins28. In order to explain their investment decision 
towards its shareholders, company’s managers usually ground their decision with 
at least one motive for the acquisition. We divide some of the most commonly cited 
motives the following way29: 
 Strategic motives: reduce competition, increase bargain power, defense 
mechanism (decrease the probability of being acquired, for example), 
entering into a new segment (or accelerate its process), complete the 
company’s product line, acquire complementary skills; 
 Economic motives: economies of scale, growth, increase stakeholders’ wealth, 
misvaluation of another firm, complementarity in R&D, industry shocks, 
eliminate inefficiencies (getting better use for excess cash, for example), tax 
benefits; 
 Financial motives: increase the company’s debt capacity, reduce financing 
costs, reduce taxes, reduce earnings’ variability. 
To these list, we add one additional reason which is not publicly presented to the 
company’s shareholders: Managers’ personal motives30. Through the acquisition of 
another company, managers may try, for example: to achieve some specific goal that 
would allow them to receive an extra payment (e.g. increase sales), increase their 
prestige and value to the company (making his removal more costly to the 
                                                           
28 It is important to highlight that each case has its own particularities, implying a specific approach for each 
M&As in which a company engages. 
29 In this section we will only expose some of the motives. For more detail, please see Brouthers et al. (1998); 
Brealey et al. (2010), Principles of Corporate Finance, Chapter 31; DePamphilis (2015), Mergers, Acquisitions, and 
other Restructuring Activities, Part I. 
30 Frequently present in value‐destroying acquisitions. 
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company), build an “empire”, or boost managerial ego. Other explanation is the 
“hubris hypothesis”, presented by Roll (1986): “Hubris on the part of individual 
decision makers in bidding firms can explain why bids are made even when a 
valuation above the current market price represents a positive valuation error”31. If 
this hypothesis holds, managers’ actions are recurrently not aligned with 
shareholder’s interests, due to their over‐optimism32. Roll states that even if in the 
past one undertook value‐destroying acquisitions, there is “little reason to expect 
that a particular individual bidder will refrain from bidding because he has learned 
from its own past errors”, because they still believe that their valuations are correct. 
Nevertheless, many still relate M&A with a value‐destroying (or at least not 
value‐increasing) investment decision for the acquirer. In the literature is possible to 
find an extensive debate about the returns from M&As. Many authors, having in 
account several key aspects of an acquisition, present both evidences against and in 
favor of the value added from engaging into a takeover operation33. Our view goes 
in favor of the notion that an acquisition cannot be resumed to one (or few) 
quantitative indicator34. In fact, our approach to this acquisition perfectly mirrors 
this idea. When analyzing an acquisition, one should understand the fundamentals 
behind the numbers (i.e. one should understand what drives the value‐creation, if 
                                                           
31 In the presence of value, the hubris hypothesis can also serve as an explanation for part of the premium paid 
in an acquisition. 
32 Bruner (2004), considers that the rationality (or irrationality) assumption about the markets and managers, 
influence M&A activity (Applied Mergers & Acquisitions, University Edition, p.83). 
33 Some authors even support the idea that, the lack of evidence to support that acquisitions are a value‐
increasing operation, comes from the fact that the acquirers are paying a fair price for the targets’ shares. For a 
more profound comprehension about this debate (as well as the gains distribution between the target and the 
bidder), and how investors’ perceive the value created through M&A, please see: Travlos (1987), Bradley and 
Sundaram (2006), Asquith (1983), Bradley (1988), Caves (1989), Fuller (2002), Healy (1992), Kaplan (1992), 
Loughran (1997), Maquieira (1998), Bruner (2003), Rau and Vermaelen (1997), Agrawal (1992), Megginson et al. 
(2004), Moeller et al. (2004), Cornett et al. (2011), Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2018), Leaman et al. (2004), 
Jansen and Stuart (2013). 
34 Plus, the value‐creation in M&A cannot be resumed to a single moment, such as the announcement (T=0). In 
M&A, one should consider several moment: T+30, T+180, T‐30, etc. 
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the acquisition fits in the company’s strategy, etc.). Brouthers et al. (1998) 
hypothesize that the negative performance associated to many acquisitions might 
come from the fact that this is measured by taking into account only one indicator. 
This indicator can fail to capture all the gains from the acquisition (i.e. undervalue 
the success of an acquisition)35. Another factor important to have into account when 
analyzing M&As is the difference between percentage gains and dollar gains. 
Usually, bidder and target differ considerably in size. In this situation, a dollar gain 
for the bidder may seem insignificant in percentage terms. Lastly, other rational that 
explains the evidences of negatives returns in M&A is the one presented by Leaman 
et al. (2004). They claim that many studies obscure reality behind the “law of 
averages” (sizable losses in one deal may obscure gains of several small deals).  
One related question that arises at this point is the identification of what 
draws the line between failure and success in M&A. In this respect, we defend that 
each M&A deal should be treated according to its specificities (i.e. each case is 
different). More, an acquisition comprises several “subactivities”, such as the due 
diligence process, financing, negotiation, etc., and each one of these needs to be 
“tailor‐made” to a specific deal. Consequently, the transference of a previous 
experience to a subsequent one (organizational learning) is expressly challenging in 
this context (Barkema and Schijven, 2008)36. However, any M&A should be analyzed 
ex‐post. According to McKinsey (2013), “few found a way to build and continuously 
improve an M&A capability that consistently created value”. Yet, even if the 
rationales of a previous acquisition do not apply to a subsequent one, an effective 
identification of the dissimilarities across deals can also serve as an important 
                                                           
35 Because the gains from an acquisition might be captured by stakeholders other than shareholders, or due to 
the difficulty to isolate the effects of an acquisition. 
36 The authors debated about transference of experience from one acquisition to another, deliberated learning 
mechanisms and the knowledge that may come from observing other firms’ actions.  
14 
capability to a company that possesses an active M&A program, allowing it to 
effectively implement prior experience only when it is applicable. Having this in 
mind, a company should not expect to create a formula to achieve success in 
acquisitions. The difference between hit or miss in M&A depends on the way a 
company approaches it (i.e. depends on the discipline with which companies treat 
M&As).  
The best hypothesis to achieve success in M&A is to follow a set of “rule of 
thumb”. The latter, ranges from the actively developing some capabilities, to avoid 
some common mistakes37. First, prior to make an offer, a company should conduct a 
due diligence process as complete as possible (in this phase, managers should be 
fact‐based but knowledge‐oriented). Bruner (2004) affirms that “its purpose in M&A 
is to support the valuation process, arm negotiators, test the accuracy of 
representations and warranties contained in the merger agreement, fulfill disclosure 
requirements to investors, and inform the planners of postmerger integration”38. The 
choice of the wrong target or the wrong time to acquire leads inevitably to failure. 
When a company decides to acquire another, it must be sure that the latter 
fits into its strategy and that it perfectly identifies what drives (will drive) the value‐
creation39. Moreover, the expectations on synergies should be reassessed as the 
bidder learns more about the target. These are based on limited information (the one 
available at the time of the due diligence process), and after the completion of the 
deal, these estimates should serve as a basis, rather than the goal. At the same time, 
transparency plays a central role in the creation of value. Particularly, higher 
transparency during the negotiations, helps reducing the uncertainty about the 
                                                           
37 Here, we will approach those which we consider that extend to the majority of the companies. These “good” 
practices are not limited to the ones we will refer. For more details, see Bruner (2004), Chapter 38, for example.   
38 Bruner (2004), Applied Mergers & Acquisitions, University Edition, Chapter 8, p.228. 
39 It is important to highlight that both companies should focus on creating value, instead of claiming value. 
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potential gains that come from the acquisition, i.e. reduces the information gap and 
increase the probability of bidding efficiently. At the announcement, and during 
integration, bidders usually benefit from transparency concerning the synergies, 
risks (and its respective mitigations plans), and investments required to achieve 
them40. Those who disclosed detailed information, and subsequently update the 
market, are more likely to hold a positive effect on their share‐price. 
On the other hand, there are some behaviors that a company should avoid 
when engaging into an acquisition. One that stands out is overpayment. On its turn, 
overpayment might occur due to multiple reasons, such as: overestimation of the 
potential synergies (especially revenue synergies); overpayment for assets that “go 
down in the elevator” at the end of the day; failure in perceiving the time at which 
the synergies will emerge, and for how long they will prevail; overoptimistic 
evaluation of market potential; or overconfidence in the ability to integrate a firm. 
Nevertheless, in certain conditions, a given company can rationally overpay. For 
example, if the costs of losing a target to a competitor are superior to the ones from 
overpaying, a company can rationally overpay (minimizing its costs)41. Another 
scenario, yet a more difficult one to test, is the case in which a company could be in 
a worst situation if it had not acquired a given company, even if that acquisition 
turns out to be a value‐destroying operation.  
Equally important is the maintenance of the company’s focus on the strategy. 
Managers should not cede to pressures from the market, such as short‐termism. 
Indeed, this may lead to a vicious circle: pressure to grow or to show results may 
lead to the settlement of unrealistic expectations (about the speed, ease, amount, and 
                                                           
40 Plus, it is important to clearly communicate the goals of a given takeover within the firm. On the other hand, 
companies need to be careful with the values which they present. If they are not rationally supported, or if they 
strongly deviate for reality, this signaling device may not be efficient. 
41 In contrast, if this rational does not hold, winning an auction can be more expensive than losing it – winner’s 
curse. 
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rewards of M&As), which consequently leads to the increase of the probability of 
failure, and ultimately to intensification of the pressure to show results. As a result, 
those who are held captive by investors’ demands for quick payoffs, end up 
neglecting long‐term growth. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
 In order to evaluate Amazon’s acquisition of WFM and to give an answer to 
the research questions which we propose to explore, we had to resort to multiple 
sources of information. As previously stated, an acquisition is an extreme complex 
operation, and resuming its evaluation only to quantitative data can lead us to 
wrong conclusions. Therefore, we gathered information from: the SEC fillings 
concerning the acquisition; news and articles about the takeover (from the date of 
the public announcement, until the beginning of 2019); and from annual financial 
statements produced by both companies42.  
By including non‐quantitative data (“soft” information) in our analysis, we 
were able to provide a rational for the numbers which we will present. On top of 
that, this kind of data is particularly valuable to understand what may drive value‐
creation on the long‐term. In addition, to complement our understanding about the 
“subactivities” related to Amazon’s acquisition, and enforce our critical sense, in 
subsequent sections we will also link the specificities of the deal with its related 
literature.  
Concerning the quantitative approach of our study, we will also analyze: how 
the market reacted to the acquisition (weak‐form test)43; compute the cumulative‐
abnormal‐returns (semi‐strong test); and evaluate the fairness of Amazon’s offer by 
conducting a multiple valuation of WFM. Thus, we resorted to Thompson Reuters 
                                                           
42 To collect these information we resort to Thompson‐Reuters Eikon database and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s website. 
43 According to Bruner (2004), there are three ways of testing M&As’ profitability: weak form  (which consists in 
comparing the companies’ stock prices before and after the deal); semi‐strong form (which consists in comparing 
the companies’ returns against a benchmark); and strong form (which consists in comparing the companies’ 
situation with vs without the acquisition). 
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Eikon Database to collect data regarding: both companies’ historical stock prices (as 
well as for the NASDAQ 100 Index, the benchmark to compute the cumulative‐
abnormal‐returns); and a set of multiples to evaluate WFM’s enterprise value and 
stock price on the closest moment, depending on the available data, preceding the 
announcement of the deal.  
 
 3.2. Case Study Methodology 
One of the reasons that lead us to choose this particular takeover was the fact 
that this was not an “average case”, i.e. apart from the fact that this acquisition 
represented the biggest one engaged by Amazon, and from its complexity, it might 
be worth to understand the fundamentals behind Amazon’s decision what it signals 
to the market. Having all this in mind, it is reasonable to state that the case study 
methodology is the most suitable way to give an answer to the questions that we 
propose to discuss in this paper. More specifically, we propose to appraise the 
following topics: (1) analyze the acquisition’s key aspects; (2) what signals does the 
acquisition sends to the market (taking into consideration the changes in the 
consumers’ preferences), and about Amazon’s future moves.  
One major advantage of a case study research is its adequacy for discovering 
new patterns and behaviors, focusing on describe, rather than test (in a context of 
M&A, this type of studies can be crucial to identify possible drivers of returns). 
According to Yin (2003) “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real‐life context […]. It copes with the 
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion […]”. Dul and Hak (2008), 
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add to this definition other important characteristic transversal to case studies, 
pointing that “a case study is an inquiry of only one single instance (the case), or 
sometimes a small number of instances, of the object of study”.  
When compared to the majority of the studies about M&A activity, one key 
difference is the method of data analysis. Here, we will draw our conclusions using 
primarily a qualitative analysis of this case in particular. The contrast with the 
related literature around the M&A activity is evident, as the latter focus mainly on 
a large sample, i.e. they frequently use data from a population/several cases over a 
long period of time to draw their conclusions, trying to provide broad theories or 
hypothesis. It is also important to highlight that the use of whether qualitative or 
quantitative data are not exclusive to either of the methods exposed here. The use of 
different sources of information, from published news to the information extracted 
from the financial statements, perfectly reflect this point of view. 
As it was argued by Bruner (2004), a deterministic sense is not suitable when 
one studies an M&A deal. These deals strongly depend on the human behavior, 
which is uncertain. As a consequence, the outcomes of an acquisitions will be largely 
influenced by this human factor. The idea that “If X is the condition, Y is the 
outcome” limits our analysis, or can even lead us to wrong conclusions. In other 
words, this methodology is the most appropriate way to give answers when the 
topic in question is complex and with a considerable degree of uncertainty44. Lastly, 
we recognize that the acceptance of a case study by its audience is strictly dependent 
on the validity claims contained in it, as well as “the status these claims obtain in 
dialogue with other validity claims”45. 
                                                           
44 Examples of case studies concerning M&A cases: Lys and Vincent (1995), ATT/NCR; Bruner (1999), 
Renault/Volvo; Bruner and Eades (1992), LBO of Revco D.; Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2002), Takeover fight 
for Paramount; Ruback (1982), DuPont’s takeover of Conoco. 
45 See Flyvbjerg (2006). 
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3.3. Limitations of Case Study Methodology 
 One problem that is commonly referred when you conduct a case study is the 
fact that the results and conclusions cannot be generalized (Yin, 2003). In this specific 
case, the conclusions about the success/failure of the acquisition and posterior 
integration cannot be generalized, as some “magical formula” for M&As. We have 
to remember that the goal of this paper is to evaluate and understand the Amazon’s 
acquisition of WFM alone, and it is not expected that Amazon (or any other 
company) behaves the same way in all the takeovers they will engage. 
 The fact that the methodology chosen to this study is more oriented to 
generate hypothesis (strongly associated to the embryonic phase of the research 
process), in contrast to the mainstream studies in the literature, which are more 
focused into either testing hypothesis or theory building, is another argument 
against the case study research (Flyvbjerg, 2006) . In more detail, case studies usually 
deviate from the classical formulation of new propositions and subsequent tests (i.e. 
the use of one or more statistical tests, opposing one hypothesis against its 
alternative). However, contrary to what was exposed above, some authors argue 
that this “division” is not rigid46.  
Finally, the last “limitation” that we would like to highlight is the difficulty 
of testing the output – the knowledge – that is provided by this research (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Some troubles might, in fact, emerge if the researcher introduce some bias 
towards validation/verification of the study. Yet, this limitation could be also 
pointed to other methodologies. The problem many times attributed to case studies 
is the particularity that they give more “freedom” to subjectivity and arbitrary 
judgment. From the work developed by Campbell (1975), we can argument that a 
                                                           
46 See Eckstein (1975). 
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case study has its own value. Given that a case study enables us to “close in” on real‐
life situations, it is more likely to find a satisfactory explanation for a given event 
(contrasting with other methodologies, where it is common not to reach to a 
consensus or to present clear evidences that support a given hypothesis).  
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4. The Acquisition 
4.1. M&A Activity Framework 
To complement our understanding about the acquisition of WFM by 
Amazon, it is important to analyze the environment in which it occurred47. In fact, 
the "world" of M&A is clearly a product of the financial environment. An active 
takeover market is a strong indicator that the capital is flowing freely. In the 
literature, it is possible to find several theories trying to link the overall stock market 
performance to M&As. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), for example, postulated that 
higher merger activity is positively correlated with periods of higher stock market 
valuations. During these periods, investors usually are more optimistic about their 
investments. In this scenario, acquisitions initiated during bullish periods are 
expected to be favored (in the short‐term) by the generalized upward trend of the 
financial markets48. Notwithstanding, during these periods companies’ shares are 
more subjected to overvaluation. Some authors argue that many firms may use their 
own stocks as an “acquisition currency”, exchanging overvalued stocks for real 
assets49. Rhodes‐Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest that increases on M&As 
may be solely due to valuation issues, where overvalued firms acquire undervalued 
(or less overvalued) firms. As per the work of Duchin and Schmidt (2013), 
“acquisitions initiated during periods of high merger activity are accompanied by 
poorer quality of analysts’ forecasts, greater uncertainty, and weaker CEO turnover‐
performance sensitivity”. 
                                                           
47 See Annex – 3. M&A activity in the recent past. 
48 Following Petmezas (2009), this optimism is frequently short‐lived. Investors posteriorly revise their 
valuations in less prosperous times, and many companies fail to achieve some of the initial (biased) expectations. 
Alternatively, according to his work, low‐valuation periods do not appear to influence the reactions towards an 
acquisition announcement. 
49 See Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
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When we look over the years preceding the acquisition, we can identify 
several highs and lows concerning M&A activity. In comparison to the beginning of 
this decade, we can confirm that the operations are becoming even more 
sophisticated. As a rule, cash deals dominated recently, not only by number, but also 
by deal‐value‐added (McKinsey (2017)). 
The recent levels of M&A activity (despite the recent slight decline) equaled 
the ones from the period between the end of the past century and the beginning of 
the past decade (plus, 2015 was marked by the establishment of a new high in terms 
of M&A activity, both in the U.S. and globally). This phenomenon occurred mainly 
due to: the return of Mega‐Deals (i.e. deals over $10bn.)50, considered by many the 
“motor” of M&A, the low interest rates, the accumulation of large stockpiles of cash 
by many firms, and the recent U.S. tax reform that allowed companies to benefit 
from lower tax rates. Simultaneously, we highlight the increase in M&A activity 
involving companies based in emerging markets. In the past few years, it is possible 
to observe not only an increase of deals in their internal markets, but also an increase 
in their cross‐border deals. Overall, one of the most important factors that is driving 
M&A is the fast rate of technological change, which has been contributing to the 
disruption across sectors and fundament many cross‐sector deals. 
The year of 2016 was marked by small acquisitions. Despite the fact that levels 
of M&A activity were still above the long‐term average, in 2016 we observed a 
decrease in the number of deals and in their total value (mainly due to a slight 
decrease in mega‐deals). On the other hand, we witnessed higher prices (higher 
premiums) paid during this year, caused by the pressure to grow and the large cash 
stockpiles accumulated. In 2017, the number of deals, as well as its total value, 
                                                           
50 Despite its decline in 2016, after 2014 it is possible to observe an increase in the number of Mega‐Deals 
completed, in comparison to the previous years (likewise these deals were also well received by the investors). 
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continue the negative trend from the previous year51, despite the positive market 
performance – considering the S&P 500 – during the same period. One possible 
explanation for this decline can be the increase of the prime interest‐rate by almost 
1 percentage point between the last quarter of 2016 and the last quarter of 2017. 
Lastly, in 2018 some factors, such as the Brexit, commercial conflicts involving the 
U.S., the signs of a possible end of U.S.’s bull market, and the slight increase in the 
stock market’s volatility, also contributed for a slowdown in M&A activity.  
4.2. Pre‐Acquisition 
In M&A, when we look to what happens from the moment of the 
announcement of an offer, to the moment of the conclusion of the deal, we are only 
looking at the “tip of the iceberg”. Having this in mind, we start this section by 
analyzing some key aspects that preceded the public announcement of the deal52. 
 
4.2.1. Activism 
Today, it is common to see major companies being targeted by one (or more) 
activist investor53. Further, companies’ board seats are being increasingly occupied 
by them. In the U.S., along with this trend, more companies are putting themselves 
in the position of an activist investor, raising important questions about their 
performance and shareholder value creation54. In contrast, in the past, the general 
response to an activist action from the company’s management/board was most 
                                                           
51 Additionally, the average and median premium offered in 2017 reached the minimums levels of the past 
decade. 
52 For more detail about the several phases of the M&A process see DePamphilis (2015), Mergers, Acquisitions, 
and other Restructuring Activities, Part II: M&A process. 
53 By activist investors we mean “investment‐management firms […] that have acquired beneficial ownership of 
a company and filed a form 13D indicating intent to influence a management team.” (McKinsey, 2014). Form 
13D is required when an investor detains, directly or indirectly, at least 5% of a firm. 
54 Between 2009 and 2015, approximately half of S&P500 firms had an activist investor as part of their 
shareholders (Gantchev et al., 2018). 
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likely a defensive one. Yet, they often overreact when an activist approaches them 
(similarly, if an activist receives a negative response, they might engage into a 
“fight” for which they are really prepared)55. The opponents of the intervention of 
an activist argue that his actions are motivated by myopic interests. More 
specifically, many support that these “myopic‐activist” (especially hedge‐funds) are 
only concerned about short‐term gains, neglecting, or at the expense of, shareholder 
value in the long‐term. In this respect, Bebchuk et al. (2015) examined a five‐year 
window after an activist intervention. They provided evidence against these 
previous argument. The positive reaction (in terms of stock price) in the short‐term, 
did not come at the expense of long‐term performance. In fact, they even affirm that 
the initial reaction reflects the expected improvements in the long‐term56. 
Concerning their influence on firms that actively acquire other firms, recent 
evidences show that these firms become more selective, engage into fewer 
acquisitions, and earn higher returns, not only at the announcement of an 
acquisition, but also on the long‐term. Moreover, after analyzing the performance of 
dozens of activist campaigns, McKinsey concluded that the median activist 
campaign reverses the downward trend associated with the company targeted by 
them, and that the excess shareholder returns which they create tends to persist.  
According to Larry Kanarek57, the best response would be a cooperative one. 
He defends that an activist often has “valid reasons for pressing companies”, and 
that a posture like this is more probable to bring benefits for both the company and 
its shareholders. This vision was being increasingly shared. Nevertheless, it might 
be useful to have an outside, more rational, perspective about the company. The 
                                                           
55 As an alternative, investors (such as hedge funds) can either acquire the company if their demands are not 
listened, or ultimately sell its shares. These two mechanisms also function as a disciplinary device for the 
targeted firm. 
56 See also Clifford (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009). 
57 McKinsey & Company director in 2014. 
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ultimate goal of an activist is the maximization of the returns for the shareholders. 
In more detail, they frequently intervene when a firm underperforms when 
compared to its industry peers, namely: when the shareholders’ returns present a 
substantial lag comparing to its peers; a company is performing poorly in terms of 
revenue growth; a company is increasing its gap in margins, relative to its peers; or 
a company possesses large amounts of excess of cash and equivalents. 
In the acquisition that we propose here to analyze, Jana Partners LLC showed 
perfectly how an activist investor is able to influence companies’ decisions. On April 
10th, 2017, Jana Partners filed a Schedule 13D with the SEC disclosing that they had 
acquired approximately 8.3% of WFM’s outstanding common stock (becoming the 
second highest holder of WFM’s shares), and that they intended to engage in active 
discussions with WFM’s board of directors and management.  
The takeover market has been a mean used by activists to create value for 
shareholders. Besides the discipline that they try to instill in who runs the company, 
an activist can also have an active role in attracting a potential acquirer for a given 
firm, as well as obtaining better terms on the deal. In this particular case, Jana 
Partners had a crucial role in inducing WFM to start looking for a new direction for 
the companies’ future. On April 26th, 2017, Jana Partners’ senior representatives met 
in person with John Mackey and other WFM’s managers, in order to: present their 
perspectives on WFM; demand certain changes to WFM’s board of directors; and 
explore the company’s strategic alternatives. 
Changing the subject, on average, the market perceives activists’ 
interventions as positive news (creation of value to the shareholders), and tends to 
be efficient in differentiate between successful and unsuccessful campaigns. By 
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looking at WFM’s stock prices58, it is perceivable a strong market’s reaction to the 
news concerning Jana Partners’ connection to WFM’s. In detail, the organic grocery 
chain’s stock prices presented a change of 9.51% on April 10th (comparing to the 
previous trading day)59. At the same time, the rumors concerning a potential 
acquisition of WFM’s entire equity by Amazon or Albertsons Cos, Inc., started to 
emerge. These factors lead us to conclude that, prior the public announcement of 
Amazon’s offer, WFM’s stock price could already partially reflect (anticipate) the 
potential gains from a future corporate restructuring operation (either an actual 
acquisition or any other kind of restructuring operation). On the other hand, these 
reevaluations can also function as a deterrent for the acquisition itself, i.e. a 
substantial increase in the share price can put away an opportunity of bidding 
efficiently, and consequently create value.  
 
4.2.2. Buyback 
Approximately one month before the announcement of the acquisition, 
WFM’s board authorized a new share repurchase program, whereby the company 
could make up to $1.25bn. in stock purchases of its outstanding shares (in open 
market transaction). Under this new program, WFM would not be obligated to 
acquire any particular amount of its common stock. Also, the timing, price, and size 
of purchases would depend on the prevailing stock prices and market conditions, 
among others factors. 
                                                           
58 In order to complement the comprehension of our analysis, we provide in Appendix – 2. Companies’ historical 
stock prices, the evolution of both companies’ stock prices from April 2017 (the month in which pre‐acquisition 
process began) to the conclusion of the deal. 
59 On April 10th, WFM’s stocks also generated an abnormal‐return of approximately 9.53%. Additional 
information concerning the computation of (cumulative) abnormal‐returns, and its results, will be provided 
further in this study. 
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Usually this kind of operation is associated with one of the following reasons: 
managers’ perception that the company’s shares are undervalued; managers’ 
attempt to increase their vote ownership percentage (decreasing outside 
shareholders’ influence); compensate a company’s shareholders (as an alternative to 
the payment of dividends); and to protect the company against a possible takeover. 
According to WFM’s board, this operation also allowed them to show their 
confidence in their long‐term growth strategy, and that the company would return 
to positive comparable store sales and earnings growth in the near future. However, 
after analyzing the negotiating process (which will be discussed below), the most 
likely explanation for WFM’s decision was to position itself as a more attractive 
target, and increase its control over the outcome of the ongoing negotiations.  
Equally important is the analysis of the market reaction to this operation. In 
the literature it is possible to find evidences that stock repurchases are usually 
perceived as good news (increase in the stock price)60. However, we highpoint that, 
simultaneously with this announcement, WFM also announced several board 
appointments and resignations, an update of WFM’s business plan, and an increase 
of 29% (to $0.18) in its quarterly cash dividend. The truth is that the market barely 
reacted to these news. At this point, we remember that in the previous month, the 
company’s stocks had already been revaluated. Therefore, one possible explanation 
for the weak reaction from the market was the fact that these kind of changes in the 
firm were anticipated one month before, i.e. at the moment in which Jana Partners 
informed that it would actively influence WFM’ decisions. 
 
 
                                                           
60 Golbe and Nyman (2013), provide evidences that the larger the repurchase, the larger the increase in stock 
prices tends to be. 
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4.2.3. Target choice 
At first glance, one may be skeptical about Amazon’s decision to acquire 
WFM. According to literature, the distance between the two companies, i.e. the fact 
that the two companies operate in unrelated industries61, increases the challenge of 
integration. In general, when two unrelated companies merge the integration 
process is likely to be more extensive, due to the weak (if any) overlap of knowledge 
and skills. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several complementary resources 
and capabilities between the two companies. In our opinion, the acquisition of WFM 
is strictly aligned with Amazon’s strategy, and can be grounded in the following 
three rationales62:  
 Fast entrance in the organic food industry: in the recent past, organic food 
industry presented itself as a fast‐growing industry in the U.S. Despite the 
fact that, through Amazon Fresh63, Amazon has already had its first contact 
with food distribution, its presence was insignificant when compared to other 
grocery chains (WFM would give Amazon the possibility of diversifying its 
offerings)64. At this point, Amazon had two options: grow organically, or 
acquire an already established company in the industry. Considering the 
WFM situation, the latter would probably take less time and resources to 
Amazon, given that it would give instant access to more than 460 physical 
stores and a more ample spectrum of products. Another important aspect to 
highlight is the particularities of food warehouses. They require a certification 
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, extra care in terms of hygiene, 
                                                           
61 As it is indicated by their NAICS codes. 
62 The reasons presented by WFM’s board of directors can be found in the definitive proxy statement, filled by 
WFM on July 21st, 2017. 
63 A subsidiary of Amazon.com. 
64 In fact, accordingly to Ooghe et al. (2003), multiple acquirers tend to acquire complementary firms in terms of 
sales and growth opportunities. 
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different cooling systems, among other requirements that WFM’s stores 
could already guarantee to Amazon. Additionally, some surveys indicated a 
considerable overlap between the two companies’ customers – especially 
millennials65. This similarity would then enable Amazon to “lock” a big part 
of the existing WFM’s customer base, as well as facilitate the attraction of new 
customers66. 
 
 Expand Amazon’s distribution channels: the acquisition of WFM also allowed 
Amazon to fill a gap in its distribution channels. Prior to the acquisition, 
Amazon had already demonstrated its desire to control its delivery chain67. 
Through the acquisition of more than 460 physical stores, the online giant 
considerably increased its capabilities to fulfill one of its value propositions – 
its fast‐delivering services. In particular, WFM’s stores could function as 
“small” warehouses for Amazon’s customers’ orders. Plus, with the 
acquisition Amazon would manage to be near the population centers68. One 
example of Amazon’s commitment towards dominating this “last‐mile” of 
distribution was the introduction of Amazon Lockers into WFM’s stores. 
These lockers gave Amazon’s customers the option to collect (and return) 
their online orders into a WFM store.  
 
                                                           
65 More, a considerable (increasing) part of WFM’s customers were already Prime members. See Annex – 4. 
Amazon’s Prime Members among Whole Foods Market’s customers. 
66 A vast majority of Amazon’s Prime members are not regular shoppers at Whole Foods. On the other hand, 
organic‐food consumers are among the highest spenders. One of Amazon’s challenges/opportunities would be 
to develop new capabilities to, like it has developed on its online services, retain this customers and lead them 
to consume more. 
67 More precisely, in order to lower its shipping costs and strengthen its operational independence, Amazon had 
plans to start leasing its own delivering trucks, planes and drones. 
68 According to a Morgan Stanley report, within 2 years “33 million US households live within 5 miles of a Whole 
Foods store”. More details in https://qz.com/1077662/amazon‐prime‐could‐double‐whole‐foods‐shoppers‐over‐
the‐next‐five‐years‐morgan‐stanley/ 
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 Learning about customers’ “offline” behavior: another way to look at the deal is 
as an “acquisition of data”69. One of Amazon’s strongest features is its ability 
to predict what its online customers want to buy. By contrast, the company 
possesses practically no knowledge/experience about the “offline” behavior 
of the customers. In this sense, the acquisition could serve as a “test” for 
Amazon’s future moves into “offline” businesses (capability‐building). 
Together with the learning opportunities that WFM could offer (concerning 
in‐store selling strategies, for example), Amazon was now able to analyze the 
data from each purchase at WFM stores70. 
Without a doubt, Amazon’s technologies, expertise, deep pockets and 
reputation were important factors that lead WFM’s management, and its 
shareholders, to give the “green light” to the merger and not to seek for any other 
bid71. On top of that, WFM’s financials had been deteriorating in the years preceding 
the acquisition72. For this reason, in the table below we present a closer look on a set 
of WFM’s key metrics during the three quarters preceding the acquisition:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
69 Nowadays, many consider data the “new gold”. 
70 Especially, if the payment was made using Amazon Reward Visa Card. 
71 As it will be discussed in subsequent sections, this acquisition represents a case of mutual choice between 
WFM and Amazon. 
72 See Annex – 5. Whole Foods Market’s Key Indicators. 
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 Industry 
Median 
Jan‐2017 Apr‐2017 Jul‐2017 
Same Store Sales 
4Q Growth 
‐ (2.4%) 
(0.6%) 
(2.8%) 
0.2% 
(1.9%) 
0.7% 
Gross Profit Margin 
4Q Growth 
77.0% 33.6% 
(0.4%) 
34.1% 
(0.8%) 
34.0% 
(0.7%) 
EBITDA Margin 
4Q Growth 
43.3% 8.2% 
(0.1%) 
8.6% 
(1.0%) 
7.9% 
(1.0%) 
Operating Margin 
4Q Growth 
39.1% 3.5% 
(1.7%) 
4.6% 
(1.9%) 
4.8% 
(0.8%) 
Pretax Margin 
4Q Growth 
36.8% 3.2% 
(2.0%) 
4.3% 
(2.1%) 
4.6% 
(0.7%) 
Effective Tax Rate 
4Q Growth 
20.6% 39.1% 
2.2% 
38.9% 
(0.7%) 
38.7% 
(0.1%) 
Net Margin 
4Q Growth 
29.1% 1.9% 
(1.4%) 
2.6% 
(1.2%) 
2.8% 
(0.4%) 
Asset Turnover 
4Q Growth 
‐ 0.77 
(4.1%) 
0.58 
(1.2%) 
0.57 
(3.1%) 
Pretax ROA 
4Q Growth 
‐ 2.5% 
(1.7%) 
2.5% 
(1.2%) 
2.6% 
(0.5%) 
Pretax ROE 
4Q Growth 
3.3% 4.8% 
(2.3%) 
4.9% 
(2.3%) 
5.1% 
(1.0%) 
x Tax Complement 
4Q Growth 
0.80 0.61 
(3.4%) 
0.61 
1.1% 
0.61 
0.1% 
ROE 
4Q Growth 
2.7% 2.9% 
(1.6%) 
3.0% 
(1.3%) 
3.1% 
(0.6%) 
x Earnings Retention 
4Q Growth 
0.67 0.53 
(26.9%) 
0.56 
(19.5%) 
0.44 
(30.9%) 
Reinvestment Rate 
4Q Growth 
1.8% 1.5% 
(1.7%) 
1.7% 
(1.3%) 
1.4% 
(1.0%) 
ROIC 
4Q Growth 
‐ 1.9% 
(1.4%) 
1.9% 
(0.9%) 
2.0% 
(0.4%) 
Assets/Equity 
4Q Growth 
8.71 1.94 
1.4% 
1.94 
0.1% 
1.91 
(3.0%) 
Debt/Equity 
4Q Growth 
0.14 0.32 
(1.3%) 
0.31 
(2.5%) 
0.30 
(8.2%) 
% LT Debt to Total Capital 
4Q Growth 
1.7% 24.1% 
(0.3%) 
23.8% 
(0.4%) 
23.2% 
(1.6%) 
(Total Debt‐ Cash)/EBITDA 
4Q Growth 
(1.32) 0.81 
- 
0.76 
(20.3%) 
0.36 
(63.0%) 
Table 1: Whole Foods Market’s Key Indicators – “Red‐Flags” (quarterly). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
 
 
33 
By analyzing the table above it is possible to identify several “red‐flags” in 
WFM’s financial situation prior to the acquisition. These indicators could serve as a 
basis to understand why WFM was an attractive target to Amazon, not only due to 
the possibility that it might be trading below its potential value73 (in this case it 
would be cheaper to acquire WFM than grow organically), but also to perceive why 
WFM was intending to initiate a restructuring operation.  
In brief, we highlight that in terms of profitability (measured by its Gross 
Profit Margin or its Net Margin, for example) WFM was performing considerably 
worse than its peers74. The deterioration of the company’s “Same-Store Sales” also 
perfectly reflects one of the major problems that the company was facing prior to the 
acquisition. Lastly, by analyzing the evolution of this indicators (in comparison to 
the same period of the previous year), it is perceptible the deterioration of WFM’s 
financial situation. 
 
4.3. Details about the Acquisition 
Regarding the offer that was made, the majority of the analysts considered 
that it was based on a fair valuation of WFM and its potential synergies. Also, it was 
almost unanimous that the acceptance of the offer would be very beneficial for the 
current WFM’ management75 and for its investors. Indeed, the board of directors of 
each party unanimously approved and recommended the acceptance of the deal 
                                                           
73 When a company’s shares are being traded below its potential value, either due to mispricing or 
mismanagement, there is an incentive for outside parties to acquire the company (trigger effect). 
74 Yet, WFM’s return on equity was slightly higher than its peers (probably due to its higher Asset Turnover, given 
that the company presents lower margins and lower leverage). 
75 Frequently, bidders are criticized for focusing on offering excessive private benefits to the target’s 
managers/directors to the detriment of the price (agency problems). For more details, see Annex – 6. Interests of 
Whole Foods Market’s Directors and Executive Officers in the merger. Plus, following the “Agreement and Plan of 
Merger”, Amazon agreed to indemnify and hold harmless WFM’s officers and directors.  
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(while the deal required the approval by the holders of a majority of WFM’s 
outstanding shares; its approval does not require the vote of Amazon’s 
shareholders)76. John Mackey even stated that the possibility of a merger with 
Amazon was “love at first sight”, and reinforced the idea that Amazon would bust 
their loyalty programs and help them with their efforts to lower prices. 
Similarly, shortly after the announcement, some potential synergies have 
been pointed out. Many expected that Amazon, due to its past history of abdicating 
profits to gain market share, was able to reverse WFM’s trend. Along with this, it 
was expected that Amazon would be capable of: improving its operating discipline, 
significantly enhance its online offer, implement several technological innovations 
in‐store, and increase WFM’s customer base. Alternatively, the acquisition can also 
be perceived as one way to magnify the potential benefits to the present, and future, 
Amazon’s Prime members.  
On the other hand, some analysts highlighted the risks that Amazon would 
face. To those challenges coming from WFM’s performance, adds the increase of 
competition in the organic food industry77. Simultaneously, Amazon had to be 
careful to not deteriorate the idea of a farmer‐friendly brand, independent and 
authentic, which enabled WFM to conquer a considerable number of loyal clients78. 
To these set of risks we also add the uncertainty about the potential growth of 
“online grocery shopping” (i.e. uncertainty about which part of consumers will 
                                                           
76 WFM’s financial advisor for this deal, Evercore Group LLC, also considered Amazon’s offer as fair, from a 
financial point of view. For more details about Evercore’s opinion, see “Annex B”, together with section “Opinion 
of Whole Foods Market’s Financial Advisor”, from the Definitive Proxy Statement, filled by WFM on July 21st, 2017. 
WFM’s shareholders who voted against the deal, and who objected in writing to it (and comply with all of the 
applicable requirements of Texas Law), were entitled to dissenters’ rights of appraisal to obtain the fair value of 
their common stock, instead of the per share merger consideration (see Annex C from the Definitive Proxy 
Statement, filled by WFM on July 21st, 2017). 
77 This factor, together with the entrance of Amazon, could lead to thinner margins in this industry. 
78 It was speculated that Amazon would continue to rely on United Natural Foods Inc. to supply WFM. 
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change their preferences towards ordering groceries online, and how fast their 
preferences will change). 
Some retailers, which had already expressed their concerns about the taxation 
of online companies, feared that the entrance of Amazon would raise problems 
about the price competition79. These alarms turned attentions towards the Federal 
Trade Commission, which main goal is to prevent any attempt of anticompetitive 
practice, promoting the protection of the consumers (the deal also required the 
approval by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice and 
the Canadian Commissioner of Competition)80. The possibility of an opposition to 
the deal by this antitrust entity also symbolized a potential substantial cost for the 
stockholders of both firms. However, after considering what implications the 
acquisition might have in terms of lowering the competition, or setting an unfair one 
among the food industry, the acquisition was approved. 
Another topic explored in the media was the implications that the acquisition 
could bring for the current WFM’ employees. In addition to the decrease of their 
bargain power, some feared that Amazon would convert WFM’s store into click‐
and‐collect centers (automatization of WFM’s store)81. Amazon Go stores, for 
example, were already operating under this molds. Through Amazon Go app, 
costumers could register what they are buying, being automatically billed on their 
online Amazon account, without any human contact.  
 
 
                                                           
79 Amazon is currently paying taxes in every state of the U.S. in which it has physical stores. 
80 The Clayton Act of 1914 forbids an acquisition whenever “in any line of commerce or in any section of the 
country” the effect “may be substantial to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”  
81 Despite the probability of massive layoffs to be reduced in friendly acquisitions, many feared this outcome. 
However, one may argue that their jobs were already at stake due WFM’s past performance. 
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4.3.1. Financing 
In a market‐based financial system, like the one from the U.S., it is very 
common to see a company resort to the bond and/or the stock markets to satisfy its 
needs82. In order to finance the purchase of WFM, Amazon entered into a 
commitment letter with Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Goldman Sachs Lending 
Partners LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, and Bank of 
America, N.A., in order to obtain a 364‐day senior unsecured bridge term loan, 
summing a principal amount of $13.7 bn. (providing the desired speed and 
flexibility to complete the deal) 83. The availability of this bridge loan was subject to 
reduction in equivalent amounts upon the issuance by Amazon, or its subsidiaries, 
of debt securities, equity interests, or consummation of certain asset sales prior to 
the conclusion of the deal (also, this funding was contingent on the completion of 
the deal)84. Next, to fulfill its responsibilities towards the initial financing, Amazon 
choose to sell debt, totaling $16 bn. across seven tranches: 40 basis points (bps) over 
T‐Bonds for the U.S. $1bn., 3 years; 60 bps over T‐Bonds for the $1bn., 5.5 years; 75 
bps over T‐Bonds for the $2bn., 7 years; 90 bps over T‐Bonds for the $3.5bn., 10 years; 
105 bps over T‐Bonds for the $2.75bn., 20 years; 125 bps over T‐Bonds for the $3.5bn., 
30 years; and 145 bps over T‐Bonds for the $2.25bn., 40 years85. Given the infrequency 
of opportunities to acquire Amazon’s high quality debt, it was with no surprise that 
the e‐commerce giant succeeded in this operation (market for debt). 
                                                           
82 Plus, the U.S. offer high levels of protection to its investors, enhancing their willingness to finance firms. 
83 By contrast, bridge loans are typically stricter in terms of loan covenants, and have higher interest rates when 
compared to other debt securities. For more details about the financing of the deal, see Exhibit 10.1 from the 
Form 8‐K filled by Amazon on June 15th, 2017. 
84 The completion of the deal was not dependent on the way of financing chosen by Amazon. 
85 At the time, the credit ratings of Amazon, according to Standard & Poors and Moody’s were AA‐ and Baa1, 
respectively. Karampatsas et al. (2014), provided evidences that bidders holding higher credit ratings are more 
likely to use cash financing in M&A (given their lower financing constrains and easy access to debt markets).  
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From the bank’s standpoint, bridge loans possibly assure more than one 
source of income. Together with the initial source of income, banks can also profit 
from the subsequent fees from the private placement/underwriting of the company’s 
securities. It is also important to highlight the certification and monitoring role of 
banks. As it was previously referred, an acquisition is an extremely complex process. 
To this factor adds the potential for asymmetric information between parts, which 
difficult the task of estimating the potential value of an acquisition. If the logic that 
the banks are only available to finance “good projects” holds, the financing of 
Amazon’s acquisition through the bridge‐financing sends a credible sign about the 
quality of the deal. More, the financial advisor’s expertise and experience could play 
an important role in monitoring post‐acquisition actions, screening target 
candidates, valuating the target and the potential synergies, structuring the deal, 
etc.86. 
In the meantime, one may ask what other means of financing Amazon had to 
complete the acquisition. In this respect, it is possible to find in the literature some 
rationales that support Amazon’s decision. Alternatively, the online giant could 
have used internal financing – use of excess cash – or opted for issuing equity87. 
Concerning the first alternative, one may argue that Amazon intended to preserve 
its excess cash for future investments. Following Pinkowitz et al. (2013), the “link 
between cash stockpiles and cash acquisitions is not obvious”, and cash rich firms 
are less likely to make cash offers (counter to the conventional wisdom). More, 
                                                           
86 These external advisors, as well as law firms, can earn significant fees for their services. Hunter and Jagtiani 
(2003), provided evidences that larger fees are associated with larger post‐merger gains. They also state that the 
payment of larger fees is associated with a shorter time period for the completion of a deal, but not with the 
probability of its completing. More, Bao and Edmans (2011) provide evidence that skilled investment banks add 
value, due to their ability in identifying synergistic targets and negotiating more favorable terms (skilled‐advise 
hypothesis). 
87 A company’s decision about its financing also weighs against several factors, such as capital structure.  For a 
more profound analysis, see Graham‐Harvey (2001), Myers (2001), and Frank‐Goyal (2009). 
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despite the fact that Amazon had enough excess cash to acquire WFM without 
resourcing to any financing, we do not have information about its portion of USD.  
Changing the subject, the choice of financing through debt, rather than the 
issuance of equity, can also be rationally grounded. According to Myers (1984), in 
the presence of asymmetric information about the company’s/project’s true value, 
and if managers act according to the interests of the old shareholders, they will 
refuse to issue equity to finance the deal. Indeed, investors tend to react negatively 
to stock issuances (signaling hypothesis)88. Many managers decide to issue stocks 
when they perceive that its company is overvalued. Additionally, the awareness of 
this information asymmetry (even if it does not exist) also affects the price at which 
the stocks would be priced. New issues often incorporate a discount. This comes 
from the attempt to diminish the rationing and to ensure that uninformed investors 
purchase its shares (i.e. the equilibrium offer price contains a discount to invite less 
informed investors to buy a company’s shares). To conclude this section, we 
highlight that Amazon possessed large debt capacity at the time of the deal. Plus, 
despite the negative effects that debt can have on reported earnings, it is less 
sensitive to information asymmetries than equity, and functions as a disciplinary 
device for managers (given the priority of its repayments, its covenants, etc.)89.  
 
4.3.2. Payment method 
In line with the previous section, to acquire WFM, Amazon payed entirely 
with cash90. Following the literature, the choice of the payment method is 
                                                           
88 In contrast, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) provide evidences that “Acquisitions that are entirely financed 
by banks are associated with large and significantly positive acquirer announcement returns”. 
89 Long‐term debt can also be a powerful tool to deter investors’ short‐termism. 
90 In the past two decades, cash deals tended to dominate among the alternative payment methods (such as 
exchange of stocks, combination of cash and stock, subordinated debt, convertible securities, etc.). 
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unquestionably one feature that influences the completion of an acquisition. 
Additionally, this decision can also have a direct impact on investors’ reactions at 
the announcement of the deal, and on how the gains/losses will be distributed 
between the bidder and the target. In this regard, each alternative payment method 
has its pros and cons. One should always weigh them against the specificities of the 
deal91. 
Acquisitions payed entirely with cash usually shows the bidder’s confidence 
in the deal. In other words, cash deals are more frequent when the bidder is 
confident about its capabilities to obtain synergetic gains from the deal. Another 
possible rational for Amazon’s choice is the hypothesis of undervaluation of its 
shares. If its prospects about its future value implied a superior price (compared to 
the market price), exchanging shares would not be beneficial. In brief, some key 
aspects of this payment method are the following: 
 Fixed payment: in contrast with other payment methods, cash deals do not 
depend on future performance. Together with their simplicity, these deals 
give the bidder the opportunity to claim the entire value created with the 
acquisition (on the other hand, if the deal leads to value‐destruction, the 
bidder has to support all the losses). This factor could also result in less 
incentives for the target, in terms of future performance92.  
 Better market’s reaction: several evidences show that cash deals lead to greater 
returns at the announcement (evidences that link cash deals with post‐
takeover performance). Also, cash deals are more easy to evaluate (less 
exposure to market’s misvaluations)93. 
                                                           
91 For more detail about the determinants of this decision, see Ismail and Krause (2010). 
92 Yet, there are other ways to guarantee the alignment of interests between the bidder and the target, e.g. 
earnouts, escrow accounts, stock options, etc. 
93 See Rhodes‐Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Di Giuli (2013). 
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 Less exposure to price pressures: when compared with stock‐for‐stock deals 
(especially in fixed‐exchange‐ratio stock deals), cash deals are much less 
exposed to arbitrage short‐selling. At the announcement, arbitrageurs usually 
implement a strategy that consists on selling acquirer’s shares, and buying 
target’s shares to cover their position (based on the announced exchange ratio 
to remain hedged), which causes a downward pressure94.  
 Greater exposer to information asymmetry costs: in case of information 
asymmetries about the target’s true value, the acquirer supports all the costs.  
 Taxability: contrary to other payment methods, in which part of the payment 
is deferred in time, cash deals accelerate capital gains taxation. Considering 
this factor, one may argue that cash offers usually embed a premium to 
maintain its attractiveness for target’s shareholders. 
 
4.3.3. Offer and Negotiation 
The financial markets usually penalize when the negotiation period is 
extensive. Having this in mind, when two companies begin a negotiation, it is in the 
interest of both parties that the possibility of deadlock be reduced and that the total 
gains that both parties can achieve be maximized.  
One aspect that clearly stands out concerning the acquisition of WFM by 
Amazon is the relatively short time window between the announcement of the deals 
and its conclusion. Yet, and in accordance to what it was previously referred, this 
time period may be just be the “tip of the iceberg”. Prior to the public announcement 
of an offer, the target and the bidder(s) may already have discussed many details 
                                                           
94 According to Mitchell et al. (2004) and Liu and Wu (2014), part of the negative (or at least less positive) returns 
around M&As is due to arbitrage strategies. The authors found evidences that this pressure tends to disappear 
in cash deals. 
41 
about the future operation95. Following Boone and Mulherin (2009), the “decision by 
sellers to impose constrains on the number and kinds of bidders and otherwise 
‘manage’ the selling process to reduce information costs can actually create value”. 
The “traditional tool” to measure competition in corporate takeovers – i.e. the 
number of bidders that publicly attempted to acquire the company – may fail to 
capture the whole story. At the same time, one should pay extra attention when 
classifying a given deal in terms of its nature, i.e. a deal that appears to be friendly, 
may have started as a hostile one, and vice‐versa. In this regard, Boone and Mulherin 
(2007), consider that the most proper way to capture this phenomenon is by 
analyzing the data contained in the SEC documents related to the merger.  
By analyzing the definitive proxy statement concerning the acquisition, the 
short time window comes with no surprise. The first contacts received and/or 
initiated by WFM in order to engage in a corporate restructuring operation go back 
to two months prior to Amazon’s offer. Following the rumors about Amazon’s 
interest in acquiring WFM, John Mackey, Ken Meyer (a WFM’s Executive Vice 
President of Operations), and one WFM’s external consultant started to consider a 
potential merger between the two companies. Thereafter, on April 21st, 2017, one 
WFM’s outside consultant contacted Jay Carney, Amazon’s Senior Vice President of 
Corporate Affairs, to inquire whether Amazon’s representatives were interested in 
a meeting to discuss a potential strategic transaction. As a result, after three days, 
Amazon’s Vice President of Worldwide Corporate Development, contacted the 
same consultant indicating their interest in an exploratory meeting between the two 
parties96.  
                                                           
95 Hansen (2001), presents a useful model to analyze the competition among bidders prior to the public 
announcement of an offer(s). 
96 During the negotiation process, we emphasize Amazon’s efforts to both maintain the secrecy about the deal, 
and avoid the initiation of an auction for WFM. Prior to the public announcement, in order to maintain the 
secrecy about Amazon’s intentions, WFM was referred as “Walnut” to its advisors. Plus, on April 27th, 2017, 
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Simultaneously, on April 18th, WFM received a letter from an industry 
participant (“Company X”97) communicating its interests in exploring strategic 
opportunities and a potential partnership. In the following two weeks, WFM and 
Evercore Group LLC (WFM’ financial advisor at the time) also received separate 
inquiries, from four private equity firms, indicating a potential interest in being 
involved in a future leverage buy‐out, a private investment in public equity (PIPE), 
or any other transaction in light of Jana Partners’ activism.  
On April 30th, the respective CEOs of WFM and Amazon, accompanied by 
other senior representatives, met for the first time in Seattle. Despite the fact that no 
proposal for a transaction was made, nor was initiated a discussion concerning 
valuation matters, the meeting served to analyze potential strategic opportunities 
and areas of complementary capabilities between the both parties. On May 4th, 
representatives of both companies met again (in WFM’s head office) for a full day 
in‐person due diligence session (following this meeting, WFM continued its contacts 
with Amazon, providing additional data regarding WFM’s operations and other 
due diligence information). 
On May 8th, a second industry participant (“Company Y”) inquired WFM 
about its interest in initiating a conversation concerning a potential business 
relationship between the two companies. 
On May 18th, in a meeting with WFM’s representatives, “Company X” 
expressed its interest in pursuing a merger‐of‐equals transaction, which they 
believed would be potentially valued at $35.00 to $40.00 per share to WFM’s 
shareholders. On the same day, in a telephone conversation, “Company Y” 
                                                           
WFM and Amazon entered into a non‐disclosure agreement (subsequently, on May 7th, both companies entered 
into a supplement to this non‐disclosure agreement). 
97 As referred in the definitive proxy statement. Due to confidentiality matters, the name of certain companies 
involved in the negotiation process was not disclosed 
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communicated its interest in advancing in further discussions concerning a possible 
commercial relationship (such as a supply arrangement) with WFM98. 
On May 23rd, WFM received the first (non‐public) offer made by Amazon. In 
a written letter the e‐commerce giant offered to pay $41.00 per share of WFM’s 
common stock99. On top of that, Amazon reserved the right to terminate the deal if 
there was any leak/rumor about its offer, and highlighted that its interests (in WFM) 
were very sensitive100.  
On May 30th, WFM’s board met with its advisors to discuss the company’s 
long‐term outlook, business plans, its ability to achieve them, and the proposals 
made to the company (not only the recent discussions with Amazon, but also the 
previous proposals from “Company X”, “Company Y”, and the four private equity 
firms). In this meeting, Evercore acknowledged that the price proposed by Amazon 
was likely to exceed the price level that a private buyer could reasonably offer. Yet, 
after revising certain financial analyses, valuation perspectives, and comparing 
Amazon’s offer with its alternatives, WFM’s board decided to make a counter‐
proposal. Later that day, representatives from Evercore communicated a $45.00 per 
share counter‐proposal to Goldman Sachs. 
On July 1st, Goldman Sachs’ representatives communicated that Amazon was 
considering other alternatives instead of ceding to WFM’s counter‐proposal. They 
asserted that as a last stretch Amazon was willing to offer $42.00 per share (non‐
negotiable), and requested that WFM promptly replies to it. As a response, and after 
                                                           
98 However, it was not discussed any possible merger or acquisition of WFM. 
99 In M&A a correct price does not exist, rather it exists an interval of possible prices that lead to the conclusion 
of an acquisition. As long as the price offered falls within the maximum that the bidder is willing to pay (the 
cap) and the minimum that the target is willing to sell (the floor), it is possible to conclude an acquisition. 
100 On May 25th, representatives of Goldman Sachs & Co LLC, Amazon’s financial advisor, contacted WFM’s 
financial advisors reinforcing that Amazon sensitivity to confidentiality matters, and that it was not willing to 
participate in a multiparty sale process. Goldman Sachs also believed that Amazon had submitted a very strong 
proposal. 
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consulting its advisors, WFM’s board unanimously authorized Evercore to inform 
Goldman Sachs that the company was willing to move forward to negotiate a 
transaction at a $42.00 per share. On the next day, WFM received a written due 
diligence request list from Amazon, and the legal advisors of both companies started 
to negotiate the term of the merger agreement101. This process extended until July 
15th, the day in which WFM’s board unanimously determined that the merger was 
fair to, and in the best interests of, the company and its shareholders, and authorized 
the company to enter into the merger agreement102. 
Following the “Agreement and Plan of Merger”, if the deal was not 
concluded by February 15th, 2018103, either party could terminate the deal. Moreover, 
either firm could terminate the deal if: it was not obtained approval for the deal by 
WFM’s shareholders104; or an order permanently restraining/prohibiting the 
consummation of the deal becomes final and non‐appealable. Amazon could also 
terminate the deal, unilaterally, if WFM’s board changed its recommendation prior 
to the obtainment of its shareholders’ approval (however, WFM’s board could 
change its recommendation and/or terminate the merger in response to a superior 
bid, requiring WFM to give Amazon at least five business days’ prior written notice 
of its intentions, and to give Amazon the opportunity to negotiate)105. 
Alternatively, it was established that WFM’s would have to pay a termination 
fee of $400 million in the cases in which: the deal was terminated by Amazon, due 
                                                           
101 In order to analyze WFM’s projections, as a standalone company, that were considered during the negotiation 
process see Annex – 7. Whole Foods Market’s Projection. 
102 In this decision, WFM’s board weighted, among others, its prospects, competitive position, historical 
performance, potential changes in the grocery industry, and investments required to fulfil its long‐term plan.  
103 Subject to extension to May 16th, 2018, within certain conditions. 
104 In this case, WFM would be required to pay to Amazon all of the reasonable and documented out‐of‐pocket 
expenses incurred by Amazon and Merger Sub (in an amount not to exceed $25 million). See Annex – 8. Voting 
results from Whole Foods Market’s Special Meeting to approve the Merger Agreement. 
105 For more details, see Article VIII from the “Agreement and Plan of Merger” (Form 8‐k, filled by Amazon on 
June 15th, 2017). 
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to the change of recommendation by WFM’s board prior to the approval of the deal 
by its shareholders; terminated by WFM (prior to the approval) if the latter enters 
into an alternative acquisition agreement that provides a superior proposal; or if, 
within twelve months after the termination of the merger agreement, WFM or any 
of its subsidiaries enters into a definitive agreement with respect to an acquisition 
proposal. Large termination fees can be a useful tool to eliminate competing bids, as 
well as to increase the odds of completing the deal106. This way Amazon was 
protecting its interests and guaranteeing a remuneration for the costs which it had 
already incurred, such as the ones associated with the due diligence process and the 
time dispended, in the case of failure of the deal (besides, target’s shareholders tend 
to lose when a sole bidder withdraws its offer). 
Thereby, from the information extracted from the merger agreement, we 
highlight the following effects on WFM’s capital stock107:  
 Each WFM’s share of common stock issued or outstanding prior to the date 
of consummation of the deal (other than WFM’s shares owned by Amazon, 
Walnut Merger Sub, Inc., WFM, or any direct or indirect wholly‐owned 
subsidiary, not held on behalf of third parties), would be converted into the 
right to receive $42, without interests; 
 Each outstanding stock option and stock appreciation rights (whether vested 
or unvested), would be automatically cancelled and converted into the right 
to receive, without interests, an amount in cash equal to the product of the 
                                                           
106 There are two opposing strands concerning the inclusion of termination fees. The “principal‐agent theory” 
postulates that termination fees serve managers’ private interests (serving as an enhancement of their job 
security, given that eliminates competing bids). The “efficient contractual device theory” states that termination 
fees can protect the initial bidder against the costs associated with the free‐ride, by competing bidders, on 
information disclosed by them. Jeon and Ligon (2011), found that large termination fees usually are less 
beneficial to target’s shareholders, leading to the conclusion that some deals might be approved not because it 
is the most beneficial, but rather to avoid the termination fee. 
107 See Annex – 9. Aggregate number of securities to which the transaction applies. For more details, see Article IV from 
the “Agreement and Plan of Merger” (Form 8‐K, filled by Amazon on June 15th, 2017). 
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number of shares subject to the option and the excess (if any) of the merger 
consideration in relation to the exercise price per share of such option108. 
  Each restricted stock and restricted stock unit award would be canceled and 
converted into the right to receive, without interest, an amount in cash equal 
to the product of the number of shares of WFM’s common stock subject to 
such award multiplied by the merger consideration. 
 
As a result, the total consideration was estimated to be approximately $13.57 
billion (including WFM’s long‐term debt and the total fee paid by Amazon109, the 
total purchase price of the acquisition equals approximately $14.76 billion).  
 
 
 
Whole Foods 
Market´s stock price 
($)1 
Premium2 
One day prior to the 
announcement  
33.06 27.04% 
At the first contact with 
Amazon 
35.71 17.61% 
52‐weeks (prior to the 
announcement)  high 
37.03 13.42% 
52‐weeks (prior to the 
announcement)  low 
27.96 50.21% 
Table 2: Whole Foods Market’s historical stock price and implied premiums. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
1 Closing prices. 
2 Implied premium, when compared to the price offered per share from Amazon, $42. 
Note: On June 16th, 2017 (the announcement day), was the day in which was registered the highest 
percentage change in price and high trading volumes on Whole Foods Market’s stock (considering 
the period from 52‐weeks prior to the announcement to the delisting of Whole Foods Market’s 
shares). 
                                                           
108 Each option with an exercise price superior or equal to the merger consideration would be canceled without 
any payment. 
109 Accordingly to Thompson Reuters Eikon Database, Amazon paid a total fee equal to $25.704 million, while 
WFM paid a total fee equal to $45 million (0.19% and 0.33%, respectively, when compared to the total 
consideration). 
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Unquestionably, the premium is an indicator of the potential synergetic gains 
that may come from the merger between two companies. From the table above it is 
possible to conclude that, in comparison to WFM’s stock price one day prior to the 
announcement, the price offered by Amazon entails a slightly lower premium 
(27.04%) when compared to other M&A deals in 2017110. However, it is important to 
highlight the premium’s sensibility to movements in WFM’s stock price. If instead 
we consider the price at which WFM was trading at the moment in which the 
companies engaged in negotiations, it is possible to observe a considerable decrease 
on the offer’s implied premium. During the two months prior to the announcement, 
WFM’s was stably trading at similar levels from the one at the first contacts with 
Amazon. Conversely, during the week preceding the announcement, WFM’s stock 
price, accompanying the general shock that was observed in the market, suffered a 
substantial decline. For this reason, in our opinion, the evaluation of the premium 
offered by considering the price at which WFM was trading one day prior to the 
announcement may not the most appropriate one (rather, in our opinion, Amazon’s 
offer should be compared against WFM’s stock price as in the first contact between 
the two companies, which implies a premium equal to 17.61%). Lastly, it is also 
possible to affirm that, given the closeness between the 52‐week high and to the 
average stock price at which WFM’s was trading, the probability of overpayment is 
reduced in this case111. 
 Alternatively, in order to evaluate the fairness of Amazon’s offer, we 
conducted a multiple valuation of WFM’s enterprise value and price per share112: 
 
                                                           
110 Following McKinsey, the average premium offered in 2017, was above 30%. 
111 See Alexandridis et al. (2013). 
112 See Appendix – 3. Multiples Valuation of Whole Foods Market. We remember that in this study we will not focus 
on evaluating which part of the premium can be attributed to the acquisition’s synergetic gains nor to value 
control. 
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 Peer’s Average Implied 
Enterprise 
Value1 ($, 
Millions) 
Implied Share 
Price3 ($) 
EV / 12M FWD EBITDA 8.975 11,761 35.95 
EV / 12M FWD Sales 0.544 8,864 26.90 
Dividend‐Yield (%) 1.917 12,278 37.57 
Price‐to‐Book Value of Equity 3.835 13,518 41.44 
Average - 11,6052 35.464 
Table 3: Multiple valuation of Whole Foods Market. 
1 WFM’s Enterprise Value on June 6th, 2017 (computed as the sum of its market capitalization and 
total debt, minus cash & equivalents): $11.458.370.000. 
2 Implied premium, in comparison to the total consideration: 16.94% 
3 WFM’s share price on June 6th, 2017: $34.73. 
4 Implied premium, in comparison to the price paid per share: 18.44% 
 
 
From the table presented above, it is possible to conclude that, from a 
financial perspective, Amazon’s offer was fair. By comparing the average implied 
WFM’s enterprise value and stock price to Amazon’s offer, the implied premium 
ranges from 16.94% to 18.44%. For this matter, it is possible to find in the literature 
several authors linking higher premium with greater long‐term performance. 
However, we can fundament the lower premium paid by Amazon with the 
following arguments113: (1) WFM’s size, i.e. usually, the larger the target’s size, the 
smaller the premium offered; (2) small competition to acquire WFM, plus Amazon’s 
strengths, resources, and complementarity probably makes them the best option to 
merge; (3) and WFM’s small bargaining power. In spite of the small premium, 
                                                           
113 Other factors that may influence takeover premium: prior stock market returns and its volatility; market 
misvaluation; momentum in takeover premium; etc. See Simonyan (2014). 
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relying on the rationales presented above, at this point one can logically expect that 
the merger of the two companies generates significant wealth increases. 
 
4.3.4. Market Reaction to the Acquisition 
The public announcement of the takeover attempt, on June 16th, 2017, gave 
rise to much debate and caused rivers of ink to flow. Meanwhile, the acquisition 
came at the same time of other important news to the food retail sector. The entrance 
of German retail giant Lidl in the U.S., and the alarms sent by the Kroger’s profits 
turn the markets very sensitive to adverse news. At the announcement, several 
articles took the risk to say that this event could disrupt this stable industry, and that 
Amazon was the most suitable firm for turning around WFM’s recent trend. 
Furthermore, the public announcement of the offer was in harmony with the 
activism flow conducted by the hedge fund Jana Partners LLC (which was advising 
WFM to look for some potential merger in the months prior to the announcement). 
Even though the market’s reaction (i.e. investors’ perspectives about the 
value that would be created/destroyed through the deal) does not necessarily equal 
success or failure in M&A, its understanding constitutes a key indicator about the 
quality of the acquisition114. Healy (1992), for example, provides evidences “that 
there is a strong positive relation between postmerger increases in operational cash‐
flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcements”. However, in order to 
fully perceive the wealth effects of an acquisition, the researcher should not limit 
himself to a single moment. As it was discussed in previous sections, prior to the 
announcement of the acquisition, the target’s (and/or the bidder’s) share price can 
                                                           
114 The effects on stock prices, at the announcement, only reflect the true value of an acquisition if the assumption 
that the markets are efficient (in the strong‐form) holds. See Malkiel (1989), Fama (1998), and Schwert (2003). 
50 
already reflect the expectations about a potential acquisition115. Previous run‐ups 
might reflect the inclusion of the synergies’ discounted value. Plus, the larger the 
run‐up prior to an acquisition, the larger the costs will be to the bidder (run‐ups in 
the target’s share price are “financed” by the bidder’s share of total synergies). 
Betton et al. (2014) provided evidences that run‐ups in the target’s price are not offset 
(dollar‐by‐dollar) by a decrease in the markup, i.e. in their model “the run‐up/mark‐
up relation is always greater than minus one‐for‐one, is inherently nonlinear, and 
may even be positive”. This lead us to the conclusion that less anticipated bids tend 
to generate higher returns, and that after accounting for anticipation effects, bidding 
can actually be a significant wealth‐creating event for the bidder. 
On top of that, one should include rivals’ price movements on his analysis. 
Only this way the researcher can obtain a complete idea of market’s reaction to an 
acquisition. In fact, some companies may possibly weigh market’s reactions in their 
choices. Another factor that stands out is that investors usually reward acquirers 
that disclose detailed information about the value‐drivers of a given deal. Resorting 
to literature, it is possible to find evidences that some deals’ characteristics, such as 
the relative size of the target, the payment method and the type of target influence 
investors’ reactions to an acquisition116.  
As it is perceptible by analyzing both parties stock price movements, 
investors perceived Amazon’s acquisition as good news. In more detail, on June 16th, 
2017, both WFM’s and Amazon’s stock prices rose: 25.54% and 2.41%, respectively117. 
To this regard, we remember that such a positive reaction, by the bidder’s 
                                                           
115 Run‐ups do not necessarily mean inside trading. This phenomenon may occur due to informed investors, 
based on public information, perceiving some signals that a company will be a target. 
116 See footnote 33. 
117 Generating an abnormal‐return of 25.62% and 2.79%, respectively. Despite the abnormal‐return generated by 
the acquisition to Amazon does not seem substantial, it corresponds to a significant change in absolute terms. 
Plus, we also have to remember that these returns was generated during a short time period, i.e. one trading 
day. 
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shareholders, to the announcement of an acquisition constitutes an “uncommon” 
event (relying on the literature, bidder’s shareholders tend to react negatively to 
when the company announces an acquisition). For that reason, it is possible to 
conclude that the increase in Amazon’s share price happen due to the market’s 
perception that the price paid per share was inferior to the value of the target 
(standalone), plus the discounted value of the potential synergies from the deal, 
representing an indicator of the potential wealth‐creation that can be generated by 
the merger between the two companies. 
Conversely, WFM’s competitors, such as Walmart, Target, and Sprouts 
Farmers, experienced negative stock returns at the announcement: ‐4.76%, ‐5.28%, 
and ‐6.50%, respectively. This occurrence is perfectly aligned with competitors’ fears 
of the entrance of Amazon in a given sector (similar reactions could be found when 
Amazon entered in the pharmaceutical industry118). Notwithstanding, many argued 
that the severe drop in competitors’ stock prices were excessively negative. Despite 
Amazon’s competitive advantage, due to its reach, expertise and fast‐delivering 
services, these grocery companies were also strengthening its e‐commerce 
segments/presence119. Another argument was that big‐box stores will “survive”. A 
big part of the customers still prefer to see/touch the products that they buy 
(especially WFM’s loyal customers, which were identified as costumer worried 
about the origin of the products or a specific diet). This feature raised even more 
questions about the portion of customers that would start buying their groceries 
online. 
                                                           
118 See https://healthcareweekly.com/amazon‐buys‐online‐pharmacy‐pillpack/  
119 Walmart, for example, acquired some smaller online firms, such as Bonobos, Jet.com, Mod Cloth, or 
Moosejaw. 
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In order to deepen our understanding about the impacts of the acquisition on 
both companies’ returns, we also computed the cumulative‐abnormal‐returns 
(CARs)120. 
 Whole Foods Market Amazon 
CAR (T‐10, T+10) 18.85% 0.42% 
CAR (T‐49, T+10) 33.92% 1.36% 
Table 4: Cumulative‐Abnormal‐Returns (CARs). 
 
Graphically:  
 
Graph 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (T‐10; T+10) 
 
 
                                                          
120 See Appendix – 4. Cumulative-Abnormal-Returns (CARs). Nevertheless, we reinforce that looking solely  to short‐
term reactions may lead to wrong conclusions, given that they only represent expectations, not actual value 
creation. Also, CARs may underestimate the value added by multi‐deal strategies, whose real worth develops 
over the long‐term. In order to have a clear picture of the value‐creation in M&A, one should also analyze the 
long‐term effects on profitability, and comprehend what will drive value‐creation (rationales). 
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Graph 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (T‐49; T+10) 
In line with what was previously said in this study, from our analysis it is 
possible to conclude that: the announcement of the acquisition created a substantial 
return to WFM’s shareholders (anticipating significant wealth‐increases from the 
merger between the two companies). On top of that, by analyzing the second graph, 
we can conclude that the set of operations that led to the acquisition (i.e. including 
the pre‐announcement phase) also generated significant abnormal‐returns to 
WFM’s shareholders. In this matter, as it was indicated before, prior to the 
acquisition WFM not only was being targeted by Jana Partners (which intended to 
engage in active discussions with WFM’s board of directors and management), but 
also had announced a set of restructuring operations that influenced the investors’ 
prospects for the company121. However, there are no evidences that WFM’s stock 
price was already including the discounted value of the wealth increases that would 
be created by merging with Amazon. Our conclusion is that, despite the fact that 
                                                          
121 We remember that this prior run‐ups could have increased the costs (price paid) to Amazon. 
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informed investors’ revaluations of WFM could already anticipate some kind of 
future operation between WFM and another party, Amazon’s offer was 
unanticipated. 
By examining both graphs presented above, the acquisition did not appear to 
generate any significant abnormal‐return to Amazon’s shareholders (also it does not 
appear to exist any evidence of anticipation of the deal). Yet, we have to remember 
that, given the relative size of the two companies, a percentage change on Amazon’s 
stock price cannot be directly compared to a percentage change, in the same amount, 
on WFM’s stock price. On the other hand, if we compute the average abnormal‐
return for the next 20 trading‐days after the announcement of the acquisition, it is 
perceptible that this event was, in fact, a significant wealth‐creating one to Amazon. 
Concretely, the acquisition generated an average supernormal return equal to 
0.088%122. At first glance, this return may not seem substantial. However, we have 
to remind that this return relates to a short very period (one trading‐day). 
Alternatively, we also hypothesize the fact that Amazon’s stock price may already 
include a premium related to its M&A activity (“serial acquirer premium”). In other 
words, if we consider Amazon’s success on the series of acquisitions engaged by 
them in the previous years, and the role that acquisitions play on Amazon’s strategy, 
we raise the possibility that Amazon’s stock price may already include the 
anticipation of future bids (plus its contribution for Amazon’s success)123. As a result, 
if this hypothesis holds, our analysis, as well as similar studies focused on other 
Amazon’s acquisitions, may underestimate the market’s reaction to the 
announcement of an acquisition by the company. 
                                                           
122 24.92%, in annual terms. 
123 Following Leaman et al. (2004), the market tends to reward serial acquirers. The authors also provide 
empirical support for the advantages of a dynamic M&A strategy over the long‐term (compared to one‐time 
acquirers). 
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To conclude this section, we also emphasize the speculation about a 
competitive (superior) bid on the days following the announcement. Many of the 
attentions were turned especially to Walmart, as some investors speculated that the 
world’s largest retailer would respond to the announcement with an offer (in fact, 
WFM’s shares were trading above the price offered by Amazon)124. Yet, neither 
Walmart, nor any other company, showed any visible sign (at least to the public) 
about considering making any offer. 
 
4.3.5. Merger  
The form used to incorporate WFM into Amazon’s ecosystem can be 
classified as a reverse triangular merger. Walnut Merger Sub, Inc. (an indirect 
wholly owned subsidiary of Amazon.com which, apart from its formation and the 
activity related to the acquisition of WFM, did not had any other activities)125, was 
the third participant in the transaction. In more detail, the organic food chain merged 
with Walnut (the special‐purpose‐vehicle) and continued to exist. As a result of this 
operation, WFM became a subsidiary to Amazon. Another aspects about this 
operation important to highlight here are the fact that WFM continued to operate its 
stores under WFM’s name/brand, and that John Mackey maintained his functions as 
CEO of WFM126. Conversely, individuals holding positions as directors of Walnut at 
the effective time would become the initial directors of the surviving corporation.  
                                                           
124 More specifically, its share price exceeded Amazon’s offer by more than $1.5. 
125 After the completion of the deal, each share of common stock (100 shares, par value $0.01) of Merger Sub 
would be converted into one share of common stock (par value $0.01 per share) of the surviving company. 
126 The maintenance of the incumbent management teams/directors constitutes a common practice among 
friendly acquisitions, and facilitates the integration process. On the other hand, and despite WFM’s recent 
changes on its boards, Amazon requested (accordingly to the “Agreement and Plan of Merger”) that WFM used 
its commercially reasonable efforts to cause the resignation of some of its, or its subsidiaries, directors. It is also 
important to highlight that, on May 9th, 2017, WFM performed several changes on its board. 
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 From a financial perspective, the use of special‐purpose‐vehicles (SPVs) can 
be an effective tool to manage parent firm’s risk exposure. In other words, SPVs 
usually serve to protect the parent company in case of bankruptcy, loan default, or 
any loss on these assets. Concerning our case, we identified two rationales that 
support Amazon’s decision to include a third part in the deal, namely: to facilitate 
the tracking of the financials related to WFM, and to facilitate the “transfer” of the 
innumerous WFM’s permits and contracts127.  
 Complementary, the merger agreement contained certain pre‐closing 
covenants. From these, we highlight covenants concerning (within certain 
conditions): the conduction of WFM’s activity in its ordinary course, and the refrain 
of initiating certain activities without Amazon’s consent; restructuring operations 
for WFM’s and its subsidiaries; the issuance/sell/transference of WFM’s and its 
subsidiaries shares, and the issuance of any debt security, by WFM; covenants not 
to solicit or negotiate any other bid, or provide non‐public information with 
alternative bidders (WFM and its subsidiaries should also notify Amazon if any 
proposal/indication of interests was received); and covenants requiring WFM’s 
board to recommend WFM’s shareholders to approve the deal128. On the other hand, 
it was not imposed any action/restriction to Amazon with respect to any 
asset/operation/business of Amazon’s, WFM’s, or any subsidiary, other than 
divestiture of certain WFM’s assets.  
 
 
 
                                                           
127 Additionally, the use of SPVs is commonly linked with legal and tax considerations. However, these topics 
will not be our focus in this study, for more detail see, for example, Hartgraves (2002). 
128 For more details, see Article VI from the “Agreement and Plan of Merger” (Form 8‐k, filled by Amazon on 
June 15th, 2017). 
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4.3.6. Going‐Private Decision 
In line with the previous section, afterward the conclusion of the deal, WFM 
was delisted from NASDAQ and deregistered under the Exchange Act129. Going‐
private announcements are usually perceived as good news. One of the arguments 
that support this perception is the potential value increases enabled by private 
ownership. DeAngelo (1984) provided evidences that, in an M&A context, target 
shareholder experienced wealth increases after going‐private. Also, Jensen (1986) 
claims that going‐private could be used to align managers’ interests and improve 
the monitoring within a company, leading to efficiency gains. Private companies can 
also benefit from savings of registration and other public ownership expenses 
(especially, after the approval of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX)130, public firms’ 
disclosure requirements and penalties increased). In our case, the delistment of 
WFM’s allowed Amazon to profit from economies of scale concerning public 
registrations.  
Another important aspect with the delistment of a given company is related 
to the avoidance of certain constraints of the public capital markets. In line with what 
was previously said in this study, listed companies are more exposed to public 
investors’ short‐termism (especially when firms start to mature and see their growth 
decelerate)131. Their demand for quick payoffs (short‐term earnings 
                                                           
129 This decision affects WFM’s information available to the public, constraining our ability to analyze WFM’s 
performance after the deal. 
130 Approved in 2002, the SOX had in mind the enhancement of investors’ confidence in the U.S. capital market. 
For more detail about SOX’s implications, and about its main provisions, please see Engel et al. (2007) and Kamar 
et al. (2007). 
131 Hackbarth et al. (2018), classify short‐termism as another dimension of the agency costs of debt: “Less long‐
term effort reduces the risk of investment benefits being largely reaped by bondholders and also make it cheaper 
for shareholders to incentivize more short‐term effort”. The authors also defend that there may have optimal 
levels of short‐termism, stating that it might be “desirable for shareholders of a financially distressed firm 
financed with debt”. 
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growth/performance) frequently conditions firms’ ability to take (optimal) long‐
term value enhancing operations.  
On top of making it easier for companies with good growth perspectives to 
invest in the long‐term, going‐private also prevents “public scrutiny” concerning 
certain decisions. Often, companies which have been bought and went through the 
process of going‐private, increase their restructuring operations132. More specifically, 
these companies commonly conduct divestment operations, either by selling assets 
or by exiting from a less productive segment (which might indicate that some listed 
companies are affected by agency problems).  
We also point out one key difference between our case and those which do 
not stem from any merger or acquisition (e.g. when public corporate ownership is 
replaced by full equity ownership by the incumbent managers). Many argue that the 
latter might not be beneficial for the company, due to the reduction of its future 
financing alternatives (namely, the equity market). In our case, we cannot say that 
WFM fully departed from the equity market, given that, after the acquisition, the 
organic‐food chain become “indirectly” quoted through Amazon.  
Lastly, we emphasize that this operation might be merely a transitory 
process. Frequently, after the implementation of several corporate restructuring 
operations, many companies reverse the process of privatization. In other words, 
the privatization of a given company may enable the avoidance of a certain turmoil 
during the execution of certain restructuring operations. Having this in mind, we do 
not rule out the hypothesis of future initial‐public‐offer for WFM. 
 
                                                           
132 According to Bharath et al. (2014), firms that went private also decrease employment and capital investments.  
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4.4. Post‐Acquisition 
One of the major causes that lead to failure in M&As is the lack of capabilities 
to integrate the acquired firm133. The “numbers” presented before the completion of 
an acquisition can rapidly change. Also, time is a silent killer of deals. Investors tend 
to penalize a company if the results from an acquisition take too long to appear (if 
they appear at all). The more a company delays the integration process of a 
company, the more difficult it would be to capture certain synergies, and more able 
would its competitors be to close the gap created by the acquisition134. Having this 
in mind, we reserve this section to explore some of Amazon’s post‐acquisition 
actions that contributed for the integration of WFM.  
On the verge of the conclusion of the deal (on August 28th 2017), the two 
companies announced that on the first day of the “marriage” the prices of some 
selected groceries would be lower135 (with the guarantee of maintaining the quality) 
and that WFM’s brands products136 would become available on Amazon.com, 
Amazon Fresh, Prime Pantry and Prime Now. Among the changes that were 
anticipated to be implemented at WFM, we highlight: the integration of Amazon 
Prime into WFM’s point‐of‐sale system, allowing prime members to obtain special 
in‐store benefits; Amazon Prime would be the WFM’ customers new reward 
program; and the introduction of the “Amazon Lockers” in some selected WFM’s 
stores. The latter, would give to the customers the possibility to collect their products 
                                                           
133 WFM’s size adds complexity to the deal (more difficult to integrate). Yet, following the literature, a deal’s 
potential synergies tend to increase with size. 
134 Following the work developed by Uhlenbruck et al. (2016), accounting for the rivals’ actions in response of 
an acquisition is essential to have a full perception of the operation. Rivals can exploit some distraction of the 
acquirer in order to limit or eliminate an acquirer’s competitive advantage or gains. 
135 With this announcement, WFM’s competitors suffered again a decline in their stock prices. 
136 365 Everyday Value, Whole Foods Market, Whole Paws and Whole Catch. 
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ordered from Amazon.com on a WFM’s store, as well as send returns back to 
Amazon137.  
Amazon stated that its focus would be “to make high‐quality, natural and 
organic food affordable for everyone”138. To the public, the last part of this statement 
represented an obvious move after the acquisition. WFM was known to have 
significantly higher prices than the average grocery store. In fact, according to 
Morgan Stanley, WFM’s prices were approximately 15% higher than its competitors. 
Many believed that the key for Amazon’s success on this competitive sector would 
strongly rely on its well‐known ability to cut costs.  
One day after Amazon took control of WFM it was already possible to read 
some feedbacks given by WFM’s usual shoppers. To them, it was not perceptible 
any difference in terms of prices in the organic food chain. Yet, who reported these 
opinions emphasized the fact that this acquisition was undoubtedly a long‐term 
play. Stephen Beck, owner of a management consulting firm in New York stated 
“This isn’t about groceries anymore. It’s about pulling people into the Amazon 
ecosystem. All the signs in the store are saying, ‘Look at what Amazon’s doing for 
you’.”  
On the bright side, the announcement of price cuts attracted more customers 
to WFM. Amazon was already a big threat to other retailers. With its entrance in 
brick‐to‐mortar stores, it was reported a decrease in the foot traffic in several 
competitors. Following the research firm Thasos Group “foot traffic jumped by 
                                                           
137 For more details, please see 
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_wfmex_2a1_w?node=6442600011&ref=wk_wfm_em_l&pf_rd_
m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=merchandised‐search‐
8&pf_rd_r=5RWNJ5MDSGHXPX4F6DK3&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=3db57c1f‐7ff0‐4352‐9f63‐
b3e7bc825611&pf_rd_i=17235386011 
138 One of the company’s first moves after the acquisition was to enter into several supplier commitments (non‐
callable) with some WFM’s previous suppliers. 
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roughly 33% in the first week”, stating that “24% of new Whole Foods customers 
were previously loyal Walmart customers”. Concerning other grocery chains, 
Thasos Group informed that Trader Joe’s, Sprouts and Target Corp, saw 10%, 8% 
and 3% of their customer base, respectively, go to a WFM’s store139. At this point, the 
general consensus was that Amazon should continue to make an effort to cut prices 
at WFM to attract more customers to its “new” physical stores.  
Throughout the first month after the conclusion of the deal, Walmart made 
some price cuts on its products as a direct response to Amazon. Furthermore, 
Walmart’s subsidiary Jet.com140 publicized the launch of a new brand, Uniquely J, 
dedicated to younger customers (as it was previously said, a considerable part of 
Amazon’s customers are the “millennials”). This move reveals that Walmart was 
willing to invest and compete with Amazon on its own “backyard”141.  
On October of that year, and after the first impact of the deal, it was already 
possible to have a different perspective about it. Since the conclusion of the 
acquisition, approximately $1.6 million of WFM’s products were sold on Amazon 
website and its related services. However, less satisfying news started to emerge 
concerning the WFM’s groceries prices. During this time window, several products 
had seen their prices return to previous levels, resulting into a drop of only 1.2%. 
Gordon Haskett Research Advisors tracked prices of about 110 items, during five 
weeks at a Whole Foods in Princeton, and concluded the following: the price of 17 
items declined, the price of 16 items raised, and the remaining ones did not show 
any significant change. They denoted too that the majority of marketdowns were in 
                                                           
139 Similarly, Orbital Insight and Foursquare reported that both parking lot and in‐store traffic increased in the 
days following the announcement. 
140 A fast‐growing online retailer bought by Walmart for $3bn., in 2016. 
141 Walmart has also reach an agreement with Google, enabling its customers to make their orders by voice on 
Google devices (competing with Amazon’s Alexa), and an agreement with Uber Technologies Inc. to enhance 
its grocery delivering service. 
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products with a higher profit margin and in products that families tend to buy 
frequently. To Jan Kniffen, an industry consultant and former department store 
executive, “The whole game is that you want the 100 most recognizable things […] 
to be cheaper”; “If you can do that, you can build a perception that the whole store 
is competitively priced”. Indeed, in this context, perception matters a lot. As long as 
the customers feel that they are getting a good deal, price is not a major problem142. 
Notwithstanding, in the next month Amazon showed once again its commitment to 
lure more customers to WFM and fulfil its initial promises, by announcing a second 
round of price cuts in some selected WFM’s products.  
The year of 2018 began with some adverse news to Amazon. Its “new” 
competitors presented a sales increase accompanied by a good stock performance. 
Additionally, they were also reinforcing their click‐and‐collect programs and 
investments in cashierless‐technologies. In this respect, Jeremy Bowman 
emphasized the complexity of the challenges that Amazon would face with this 
acquisition, remembering that it is “hard to rewrite the rules of an industry with 
such a small slice of the pie”. Simultaneously, some WFM’s stores were facing 
difficulties in managing its in‐store stocks. 
On February 2018, Amazon added one of its strengths to WFM. In particular, 
Amazon offered its Prime Members the possibility to receive their orders, from 
Prime Now app and Amazon’s website, within two hours143. This event was 
described in the news as Amazon’s biggest move since it acquired WFM. Even 
though this feature was only available in some cities, Amazon had intentions to 
extend it countrywide. When we get together this announcement with the data 
revealed by NPD Group, we can really understand the importance of this move. 
                                                           
142 A strategy that many believed to be perfectly managed by Walmart. 
143 This service was only available during WFM’s work schedule, and in orders superior to $35 no extra‐fee was 
charged. However, if the customer opted for a one‐hour delivery it would be charged an additional $8 fee. 
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Jointly with its predictions of a strong growth for online grocery sales, the market 
research company also stated that around 7% of American households have already 
shopped groceries online in 2017 (with 75% of these being delivered at home).  
In this area, Amazon could effectively gain from its competitive advantage. 
Despite the actions of WFM’s competitors (as the ones, previously referred, took by 
Walmart, the acquisition of Shipt by Target, promising same‐day deliveries, or the 
trials conducted by Kroger about home delivery), Amazon was already prepared to 
give response to one of the major reasons for people to shop online: its convenience. 
According to a survey done by Walter Sands Communications, this was the second 
most cited reason to shop online, with 23% of the responses, only after the perception 
of being less expensive, with 40%. 
One important aspect that we have to highlight here is the success of WFM’s 
private brand after the acquisition. One Click Retail144 advanced with the 
information that 365 Every Day Value was already the second most sold private 
brand by Amazon. However, a couple of problems were also pointed out on the 
news about how the two companies were operating. On the one hand, it was still 
possible to order products from WFM’s competitor Sprouts Farmers Market through 
Amazon’s Prime Now. On the other hand, WFM’s products could still be delivered 
by Instacart in some cities in the United States145. 
On February 20th 2018, another important announcement was made. Prime 
members were now able to benefit from a 5% cashback in all WFM purchases when 
using the Amazon Prime Rewards Visa Card146. Similarly, non‐prime members 
                                                           
144 A firm specialized on the treatment of e‐commerce data, sales measurement and search optimization. 
145 Prior to the acquisition, WFM established a partnership with Instacart, a company which provides delivery 
services, in order to expand its distribution channels. 
146 Amazon Rewards Visa Cards were launched in the beginning of 2017, in a partnership with JP Morgan Chase 
& Co and Visa Inc. For more information, see https://media.wholefoodsmarket.com/news/prime‐members‐now‐
earn‐5‐back‐when‐shopping‐at‐whole‐foods‐market‐using‐the; and 
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could also benefit from a 3% cashback in the same purchases. Besides the increased 
probability of locking its customers, Amazon was really showing its efforts to 
compete with other grocery chains. Walmart, for example, already had its own credit 
card program which allowed, among others, its shoppers to spare 3% on 
Walmart.com (including grocery pickup purchases). 
On April 2018, new insides emerged about the evolution of WFM’s products 
prices. Morgan Stanley, which has been accompanying a basket of WFM’s products 
since 2014, concluded that although the cost of the basket at WFM was on historical 
minimums (registering a drop of about 5.3%, year‐over‐year), it remained more 
expensive than those bought at Kroger or Sprouts Farmers Market. It also denoted 
that the same basket would be cheaper if it was bought to “regional conventional 
food retailers”. However, there are two factors important to take into account. First, 
some costs incurred by WFM’s suppliers have rose during this period. Second, 
Morgan Stanley highlighted that there were clear signs that WFM was on the road 
to recovery. This idea is supported by the fact that WFM’s basket recorded a bigger 
decrease in price, than Kroger and Sprouts Farmers (these recorded a drop of 1.7% 
and 1.1%, respectively, during the same time period). Complementarily, on an 
article from the Business Insider, it was possible to perceive the intensification of the 
price war lived at the time. Whereas Amazon was making efforts to close the gap 
between its in‐store prices and those from its competitors, the latter were making 
similar efforts in their online platforms147. 
                                                           
https://www.amazon.com/iss/credit/rewardscardmember/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_WPFUNREC_3a1_w?plattr=CBC
CWPF&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=merchandised‐search‐
1&pf_rd_r=RSNN11Z93HA3SDT674VF&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=896fae6d‐32fc‐4570‐a06a‐
6c5062bf916a&pf_rd_i=17599167011 
147 According to the same article, Walmart and Target, were now price‐matching 53% and 35% (respectively) 
with Amazon’s online prices. 
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The general consensus, until this date, was that WFM’s stores did not 
changed significantly. Still, Amazon’s efforts to expand the two‐hour deliver service 
and the special opportunities in‐store destined to its Prime members continued to 
make headlines. As expected, Amazon Prime membership was having a 
fundamental role in Amazon’s plan. As it was shown in the past, this “unifying 
product” continued to be an important factor for Amazon’s growth. Despite the 
announcement of a future increase in its annual fee148, on April 2018, Jeff Bezos 
announced that the number of Prime Members reached the mark of 100 million 
subscribers worldwide149.  
One year after the announcement, several reports emerged with a complete 
analysis of the changes at WFM’s stores as well as the company integration into the 
Amazon’s “ecosystem”. The acquisition had already shaken the way people 
perceived online groceries purchases. Many believed that the entrance of Amazon 
in the food industry had enhanced the percentage of American households that buy 
their groceries online150. Amazon also proved that it was possible to make profits 
with a basket of products with a much smaller size than it was thought. More, the 
competition triggered by its entrance makes the consumers the real winners.  
One interesting conclusion after one year was the fact that WFM’s gains in 
terms of foot traffic had been made at the expense of small grocery retailers (in 
particular from the ones located near WFM’s stores in more‐urban locations)151. Big 
chains, like Walmart and Kroger did not felt any significant loss. Nevertheless, these 
two rivals have made huge investments to maintain their advantage. The next move 
                                                           
148 An increase by 20% to $119, annually. 
149 Amazon does not disclose any detailed information about its Prime members. Apart from this information, 
we can only rely on estimates. 
150 NPD Group reported a raise from 6% to 16%, from the beginning of 2017 until half of 2018 (considering home 
deliveries and click‐and‐collect). 
151 WFM’s “new” loyal customers represented 3% of its customer base. 
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expected from Amazon was to make long‐term investments which would give them 
the possibility to gain market share to the detriment of these big grocery chains152.  
Declarations of John Mackey affirming that the “customers have already 
saved hundreds of millions of dollars” may lead us to conclude that the first year of 
the “marriage” was truly beneficial for WFM’s customers. Yet, these “savings” came 
at the expense of the quality of the product, in the opinion of several previously loyal 
customers. Many noticed a decrease in the quality of the products and even that 
some of them were no longer available at WFM153. The question about if the 
“premium” paid for WFM’s products was really worth it was, consequentially, 
reinforced. 
On August 2018, another big innovation was introduced in WFM’s stores. In 
order to draw more clients to WFM’s stores and increase its number of online 
grocery orders, Amazon announced that, starting in some states (and with the vision 
to expand it nationally), WFM’s stores would have a new pickup point service. 
Amazon and WFM compromised to accomplish this service within 30 minutes, and 
only required the customers to park in a designated area and an employee would 
bring them their order (the payment would be made automatically from their 
Amazon’s account). More, through Amazon Echo devices154, the customers could 
“talk” with Alexa, a virtual assistant, to add products to their shopping list, 
facilitating even more the process of buying groceries. 
On September, new problems emerged for Amazon. WFM’s workers were 
making statements that could compromise the success of the integration of WFM 
into Amazon. One of the founders of the Whole Worker Community said: “No one 
                                                           
152 Since the conclusion of the acquisition, Amazon announced several times the expansion of its physical stores 
and services, and the reinforcement of its working force. 
153 The investment bank Barclays referred to this change as the “conventionalization” of Whole Foods Market. 
154 These devices would also be available at WFM’s stores. 
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trusts Amazon and there are fears in upper management that Amazon will clean 
house if sales rates aren’t hit”. Since the takeover, some classes of jobs were being 
progressively eliminated. Therefore, many feared that Amazon was trying to 
transform them into “robots”.  WFM’s workers were “expected to do more with 
restricted labor budgets”. Other employees stated that “local and specialty products 
have been cut and replaced with more conventional mainstream ones and regional 
marketing and sign making has been removed”155.  
Later on that same year, WFM came at last in a study concerning the 
chemicals used in packaging hot‐food on the top 5 U.S. grocery chains. However, 
this study gave WFM an opportunity to show the public that the company did not 
distanced itself from its roots and that the general welfare was still a concern. As a 
response, WFM immediately removed all the materials causing these problems and 
started focusing on finding sustainable alternatives. 
Burt Flickinger III156, stated on November 2018 the following: “To Amazon's 
credit, they've had a few price reductions, including for Amazon Prime members. 
But Amazon has not, to this point, been able to leverage its size, scale, skill in 
procurement and buying power to effectively lower prices much.” On the same 
wave length, despite being considered the first grocery chain to successfully sell 
organic and natural products at a large scale, to many WFM continues to be a “niche 
player” (which also reinforces the task of rewriting the rules of the food industry). 
At the end of the year, Instacart announced an agreement with WFM to 
dissolute their partnership. As it was said by Tom Forte, an analyst with D.A. 
Davidson, “Amazon’s intent from day one […] was to integrate WFM with its own 
                                                           
155 These news came in line with other news reporting the fact that Amazon was testing its cashierless‐
technology. Yet, Amazon has denied plans to implement this technology into WFM’s stores. 
156 A managing director of Strategic Resource Group, a retail consulting firm. 
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grocery‐delivery efforts such as Amazon Fresh and Prime Now”. This seems like a 
logical move. The problem for Amazon was that Instacart added dozens of new 
retail partners and had constructed a service that allows them to use customers’ data. 
To Amazon, this could represent the strengthening of its competitors, since by 
associating with Instacart, they would be able to access data that would enable them 
to better target customers’ preferences and needs. 
The year of 2019 began with some announcements that show Amazon’s focus 
on its strategy. On one hand, WFM launched digital catalogs structured by dietary 
preferences, providing nutritional information and ingredients in its products. This 
action was in harmony with one of the reasons that lead its customers to prefer to 
buy at WFM (namely, the customers’ care about their health and their specific 
demands). On the other hand, Amazon continued to show its concerns about the 
offer of a fast delivery service at competitive prices. Accompanied by the 
announcement of the third round of price cuts in the first quarter of the year, it was 
speculated that Amazon was looking for new ways to expand its reach. In fact, at 
the beginning of 2019, it was speculated that Amazon could be preparing an 
acquisition of other company with a significant physical presence, in order to be 
closer to its users157. Lastly, in order to incentive value maximizing actions, it was 
also advanced that, starting on the first half of 2019, WFM would bring back its 
employee stock option programs to all its employees with at least 6000 service‐hours 
(which were extinguished at the moment of the acquisition). 
  
 
 
 
                                                           
157 Namely, the acquisition of Sears, the fifth larger American department store chain, at the time. 
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5. Discussion 
According to the neoclassical merger theory, mergers are a mean (short‐cut) 
by which the managers, in response to regime shifts, can pursue value‐maximizing 
operations158. In our opinion, the acquisition that we propose here to analyze 
perfectly fits into this perception. At first glance, food industry may appear to have 
little opportunities to grow. However, if we consider the complementarity between 
in‐store and online grocery sales it is possible to identify a key opportunity for 
traditional hard discount grocery chains to grow. Furthermore, in the recent past in 
the U.S., it is perceptible a profound change in consumers’ preferences (mainly 
driven by millennials). Alongside with evidences of a fast growth on online grocery 
orders, an increasing portion of American consumers are shifting their preferences 
towards healthier, environment‐friendly products.  
One logical question that arises from analyzing this acquisition is if online 
retail will fully replace in‐store retail, and consequently, if Amazon’s entrance into 
the “offline” groceries retail was an astute move. In the past, Amazon demonstrated 
its capability of disrupting the space when it enters in a business, converting 
whatever exists in it obsolete. However, in our opinion, this notion does not apply 
to the acquisition that we propose here to analyze. Despite the several potential 
changes that Amazon could implement at WFM’s stores (such as certain automated 
processes, or the expansion of WFM’s distribution channels), it is clear that the 
online giant does not intend to make in‐store sales obsolete. One of company’s major 
hurdles in the present is to get consumers that favor in‐store experience to decide 
what they want to buy (i.e. consumers that desire the see/touch the products that 
they are considering to buy, favor personal contact in order to get a feedback 
                                                           
158 See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001). 
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concerning the products, among other aspects)159 to buy and/or sign to its services. 
Besides, we have to remind that today, the majority of consumers still favor physical 
stores. In this sense, the deal would enable Amazon to gain from the 
complementarity between online and offline retail, allowing the company not only 
to expand its distribution channels and customer base, but also to develop new 
capabilities (an important part of Amazon’s strategy)160.  
Furthermore, by analyzing other retailers’ performance, it is also possible to 
conclude that, at least in the near future, the “offline” retail will not disappear, at the 
expense of online retail. Some “traditional” grocery chains, such as ALDI and Lidl, 
have been shown evidences of improvement in terms of performance and 
continuous growth (especially in the U.S.). On the other hand, by looking at WFM’s 
competitors, it is also possible to find support for the idea of complementarity 
between online and offline sales. Even though Amazon’s acquisition did not initiate 
an industry merger wave161, it gives additional support (rationally) for some of its 
investors’ investment decisions. As referred above, its competitors in the food 
industry are strongly committed to expand their online presence162, without 
divesting in their “traditional” segments. Relying on these factors, the logical 
conclusion is that one‐channel strategy is not sustainable anymore. Considering the 
change in the patterns of demand, today, in order to position themselves as a 
competitive firm in the food industry, as well as in the vast majority of sectors, 
“traditional” grocery chains need to conjugate its offerings with a strong online 
                                                           
159 As it was previously said, this applies specially to WFM’s “average” client, whom is expected to be proponent 
of going to the actual store and choose the specific products that they will buy. 
160 Amazon’s recent moves clearly show us the benefits of considering online and offline segments as 
complementary, rather than competitive ones. 
161 Defined as a period of time characterized by a significant number of mergers, simultaneously, within an 
industry. In our case, the rational that could have supported an industry merger wave would be the change in 
the pattern of demand. Yet, following Martynova and Renneboog (2008), and Harford (2004), an industry shock 
per se does not support a merger wave. 
162 An opposite movement from the one embedded on Amazon’s decision to acquire WFM. 
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presence. Conversely, we highlight the fact that, while Amazon has a competitive 
advantage in online services, due to its expertise and reach, the company still has a 
reduced number of physical stores. On this matter, WFM’s stores could serve as a 
“test” for Amazon (i.e. this acquisition could be only the company’s first experience, 
on a big scale, with “offline” retail), from which the company can develop new ways 
of selling its products, and better understand consumers’ “offline” behavior163. 
Similarly, if we consider Amazon’s plans to expand its presence not only 
within the segments in which it is already operating, but also to new ones, it becomes 
clear the fit of the acquisition in the company’s strategy. As we affirmed previously, 
one of the rationales that supported Amazon’s decision to acquire WFM was the 
acceleration of the entrance into the organic‐food industry164, however, this deal does 
not limit itself to groceries retail. From our perspective, together with the deal’s 
conglomerate features (given the involvement of two companies that operate in 
unrelated lines of business), it is also clear Amazon’s ultimate goal of a vertical 
supply chain integration of this acquisition towards the final consumer (perfectly 
reflecting Amazon’s long‐term vision of controlling its delivery chain). WFM’s 
stores are functioning as “small” warehouses for Amazon’s products, located near 
several population centers across the U.S. However, these do not have the size 
desired by Amazon to fulfil its goals165. We expect that, in the future, Amazon will 
continue to acquire other companies with a strong physical presence (or grow 
organically), in order to reinforce its distribution channels. This way, Amazon could 
                                                           
163 Furthermore, with the introduction of its products into WFM’s stores, Amazon could also benefit from 
customers’ feedback on its products and from building relationships with its customers. 
164 Allowing Amazon to add a new set of private brands to its portfolio – diversification. 
165 We have to remember that, despite the fact that the acquisition gave Amazon instant access to more than 460 
stores located strategically throughout the U.S., and WFM’s plans to open 93 new stores in existing trade areas 
as well as new areas, including international locations, its presence in the food industry continued to be residual, 
in relative terms. As it was affirmed before, one of the online giant next steps is to assume control of the last‐
mile of distribution. Plus, the company is also strongly committed in providing a fast‐delivery service of its 
products (which requires to be located near population centers). 
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either:  apply a similar strategy to the one applied into WFM’s stores, adding its 
products, and providing a click‐and‐collect service;  or ultimately convert its 
acquired physical stores into ones that exclusively sell Amazon’s 
products/services166. 
Nonetheless, it is also possible to identify a set of problems concerning the 
acquisition/integration of WFM. First, we highlight the clash of culture between the 
two companies. As it was previously referred, WFM’s distinctive culture was one of 
the factors that allowed them to attract a loyal base of customers (source of value‐
creation). Despite Amazon’s efforts to adopt the best part of each culture, the general 
perception was that the deal would distance WFM from its roots. In reality, many 
labeled it as the “conventionalization of WFM”. To support this idea, many underlined 
the fact that, after the acquisition, all the buying decisions related to in‐store 
offerings became centralized, and a new set of “common brands” names started to 
emerge on WFM’s shelves167.This way, WFM’s regional teams lost their autonomy 
to source local products, and many of its loyal customers started to feel the loss of 
“neighbor” emotionalism when shopping at WFM.  
Second, Amazon was struggling in gaining the trust of some stakeholders. In 
more detail, we highpoint WFM’s employees lack of trust on Amazon’s statements 
concerning their jobs security, which could lower their expectations for future and 
difficult their retention (some resistance to the process of integration). The truth is 
that Amazon’s tests concerning cashierless‐technologies were signaling a 
contradictory message to its statements denying future massive layoffs. On the other 
hand, WFM’s prior and new usual customers were doubting Amazons’ capability of 
                                                           
166 Following Amazon’s financial statements, the online giant was able to increase its number of physical stores 
from 472 to 527 (an increase of 11.7%), from 2017 to 2018. 
167 Following Brittain Ladd, a former Amazon’s retail consultant: “Amazon is performing a lot of analysis to 
identify what products to put on their shelves to bring the most customers, not to retain current customers”. 
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lowering WFM’s products prices. To this regard, we consider that the press set 
excessively high expectations (over‐extrapolated Amazon’s past performance). The 
truth is that Amazon is still learning, and it is predictable that the company 
continues to make efforts to gradually lower WFM’s prices (making its products 
affordable to everyone), luring more customers and, subsequently, increase its 
market share. 
Lastly, according to some reports from WFM’s usual customers, Amazon was 
struggling in managing, in some WFM’s stores, its in‐store stocks. Due to the 
significant increase of online groceries orders, part of WFM’s products were being 
directly send to the consumer, instead of being put on the shelves, generating some 
discontent among WFM’s prior loyal customers (despite the positive side of this 
problem, this would increase Amazon’s challenge to retain these customers). 
 Many analysts shared the idea that if the acquisition would not have 
occurred, the most probable scenario would be the aggravation of the WFM’ 
financials as well as the brand itself. However, one might question how Amazon 
was perceived by WFM. During the pre‐acquisition phase, the company also had 
alternative proposals, not only from another companies, but also from private equity 
funds. The logical conclusion is that Amazon’s value‐proposition was superior to 
those from its competitors. As a matter of fact, it is possible to highlight a set of 
factors that could have differentiate Amazon from its competitor bidders, namely: 
(1) Amazon’s purchasing power would be a powerful tool to accomplish WFM’s 
commitment of lowering its prices; (2) Amazon’s deep pockets would provide the 
capital required to engage certain long‐term initiatives/investments; (3) Amazon 
already possessed the infrastructure required to expand WFM’s delivery services (as 
well as to add other complementary services), enabling them to take advantage from  
this fast‐growing segment in the U.S.; (4) Amazon’s customers base and expertise 
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could be an important factor both to lure more customers to WFM’s stores, and to 
lead them to buy more, i.e. by applying a similar approach to the one applied to its 
online retail, Amazon could develop new capabilities to use data from past buys at 
WFM’s stores to offer the best suggestions and/or discounts that would maximize 
its existing and “new” customers in‐store affluence, and maximize their 
consumption. 
 From the data presented in previous sections, it is perceived a strong market 
reaction to the announcement of the acquisition. Investors anticipated significant 
wealth‐increases (synergies) from the merger between Amazon and WFM168. In our 
opinion, and considering Amazon’s innovations/investments in WFM initiated after 
the conclusion of the deal, we have reasons to believe that the market was efficient. 
Together with the fact that WFM was operating below its potential, the acquisition 
would give Amazon new growth opportunities, not only through its tangible assets 
(i.e. its physical stores, necessary to expand Amazon’s distribution channels), but 
also through its intangible assets (i.e. its expertise)169.  
To conclude we highlight that, with the aim of creating shareholder value, a 
company should effectively balance short‐term performance against investment 
decisions that would generate long‐term cash‐flows/growth170. In this sense, in many 
M&A deals value can take time to unfold. Thus, an important question that we also 
                                                           
168 In our case, the deal’s synergies can be attributed mainly to “operating synergies”. However, in order for the 
anticipated synergies to have an effective impact on Amazon’ value, it must generate: higher expected growth 
rates; longer competitive advantage period; higher cash‐flows from existing assets; or lower costs of capital. 
169 Despite the fact that synergies valuation was not our focus, we can postulate that part of the premium paid 
to acquire WFM includes a “capabilities premium”. In fact, in M&A today, there are evidences of an increasing 
market for capabilities.  
170 Alternatively, it is possible to identify some gains for WFM’s bondholders after the acquisition. After the 
acquisition, Amazon conducted an exchange offer related to the $1 bn. 5.2% senior notes due 2025 assumed in 
the acquisition of WFM, leading to an upgraded on WFM’s notes credit rating to Baa1 (Moody’s). According to 
Billett (2004) “target bonds have significantly larger returns when the target’s rating is below the acquirer’s” 
(which occurred in our case). Also, when two companies possess imperfectly correlated cash‐flows, they are able 
to reduce their systematic risk, due to the avoidance of counter cyclical dead weight costs (coinsurance). 
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need to answer is when it is expected that the synergies start to affect Amazon’s 
cash‐flows. From our perspective, the acquisition of WFM clearly represents a long‐
term move by Amazon, i.e. supports its long‐term vision of becoming the “only” 
company, allowing it to expand its geographic reach and its basket of products and 
services. Still, we also anticipate an immediate impact of the deal’s synergies on 
Amazon’s cash‐flows. To this extent, one of our limitations relies on the fact that, 
after the acquisition, we do not have access to detailed information concerning 
WFM’s operations. Plus, in order to correctly assess how the merger with WFM 
affected Amazon’s performance, we would need to know the costs of the 
implementation of certain innovations at WFM. As a result, with the purpose of 
supporting our conclusion, we decided to analyze some Amazon’s key indicators 
(from the completion of the deal until the present) 171: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
171 See also Annex – 10. Amazon’s Key Indicators. 
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 Industry 
Median 
Q3‐
2017 
Q4‐
2017 
Q1‐
2018 
Q2‐
2018 
Q3‐
2018 
Q4‐
2018 
Q1‐
2019 
Gross Profit Margin 
1Y Growth 
30.6% 37.0% 
2.0% 
36.3% 
2.5% 
39.8% 
2.6% 
42.1% 
3.9% 
41.7% 
4.7% 
38.1% 
1.8% 
43.2% 
3.4% 
EBITDA Margin 
1Y Growth 
13.3% 7.5% 
(0.6%) 
9.3% 
1.2% 
11.0% 
1.4% 
12.5% 
3.9% 
13.3% 
5.8% 
11.1% 
1.8% 
15.5% 
4.5% 
Operating Margin 
1Y Growth 
8.5% 0.8% 
(1.0%) 
3.5% 
0.6% 
3.8% 
1.0% 
5.6% 
3.9% 
6.6% 
5.8% 
5.2% 
1.7% 
7.4% 
3.6% 
Pretax Margin 
1Y Growth 
5.6% 0.7% 
(0.8%) 
3.1% 
0.4% 
3.8% 
1.1% 
4.9% 
3.1% 
6.0% 
5.3% 
4.6% 
1.5% 
7.4% 
3.6% 
Effective Tax Rate 
1Y Growth 
22.7% 18.4% 
(28.2%) 
42.9% 
7.5% 
15.0% 
(9.0%) 
2.8% 
(67.3%) 
15.0% 
(3.4%) 
14.4% 
(28.5%) 
19.0% 
4.0% 
Net Margin 
1Y Growth 
4.6% 0.6% 
(0.2%) 
1.8% 
0.1% 
3.2% 
1.2% 
4.8% 
4.3% 
5.1% 
4.5% 
4.0% 
2.2% 
6.0% 
2.8% 
Asset Turnover 
1Y Growth 
0.25 0.43 
(10.5%) 
0.49 
(13.5%) 
0.40 
(8.8%) 
0.41 
(9.7%) 
0.41 
(5.5%) 
0.47 
(3.6%) 
0.35 
(11.6%) 
Pretax ROA 
1Y Growth 
1.2% 0.3% 
(0.4%) 
1.5% 
0.0% 
1.5% 
0.3% 
2.0% 
1.2% 
2.4% 
2.1% 
2.2% 
0.7% 
2.6% 
1.1% 
Pretax ROE 
1Y Growth 
2.2% 1.3% 
(1.6%) 
7.1% 
0.8% 
6.5% 
1.8% 
7.8% 
4.8% 
9.1% 
7.8% 
8.1% 
1.0% 
9.6% 
3.1% 
x Tax Complement 
1Y Growth 
0.79 0.81 
57.8% 
0.99 
54.5% 
0.85 
11.9% 
0.97 
>99% 
0.85 
5.0% 
0.90 
(9.0%) 
0.81 
(4.8%) 
ROE 
1Y Growth 
1.8% 1.1% 
(0.4%) 
4.1% 
0.1% 
5.5% 
2.0% 
7.6% 
6.7% 
7.8% 
6.7% 
6.9% 
2.8% 
7.7% 
2.2% 
x Earnings Retention 
1Y Growth 
0.67 1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
Reinvestment Rate 
1Y Growth 
1.6% 1.1% 
(0.4%) 
4.1% 
0.1% 
5.5% 
2.0% 
7.6% 
6.7% 
7.8% 
6.7% 
6.9% 
2.8% 
7.7% 
2.2% 
ROIC 
1Y Growth 
‐ 0.4% 
(0.3%) 
1.5% 
(0.5%) 
2.1% 
0.4% 
3.1% 
2.7% 
3.4% 
3.0% 
3.1% 
1.6% 
3.4% 
1.3% 
Cash Cycle (Days) 
1Y Growth 
46.7 (17.5) 
(27.3%) 
(18.7) 
1.5% 
(21.8) 
12.5% 
(14.7) 
13.1% 
(16.8) 
3.7% 
(17.2) 
8.1% 
(23.9) 
(9.7%) 
Assets/Equity 
1Y Growth 
2.18 4.67 
17.2% 
4.74 
9.6% 
4.02 
7.5% 
3.83 
1.3% 
3.67 
(21.2%) 
3.73 
(21.2%) 
3.68 
(8.4%) 
Debt/Equity 
1Y Growth 
0.64 1.75 
64.4% 
1.59 
50.5% 
1.41 
41.9% 
1.31 
28.6% 
1.21 
(31.1%) 
1.13 
(29.0%) 
0.51 
(63.9%) 
% LT Debt to Total 
Capital 
1Y Growth 
31.4% 54.0% 
12.9% 
52.8% 
14.5% 
50.0% 
13.0% 
48.1% 
10.8% 
46.2% 
(7.8%) 
42.9% 
(9.9%) 
31.9% 
(18.1%) 
(Total Debt‐ 
Cash)/EBITDA 
1Y Growth 
12.96 3.23 
>99% 
2.85 
‐ 
2.92 
‐ 
2.89 
>99% 
2.41 
(25.3%) 
1.58 
(44.4%) 
‐ 
‐ 
Table 5: Amazon’s Post‐Acquisition Key Indicators (quarterly). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
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 Despite the impact of the acquisition on some Amazon’s indicators, from the 
table presented above it is possible to gather some evidences of Amazon’s success 
in the recent past. In comparison to the industry’s median, it is possible to conclude 
that Amazon is considerably outperforming its peers in terms of profitability and 
earnings power. Since the moment of the acquisition, Amazon perfectly managed to 
increase its profitability, combining a higher capability of generating greater free 
cash‐flows with higher margins. Moreover, during the same time period, it was also 
able to deliver increasing levels of return‐on‐assets, return‐of equity, and return‐on‐
invested‐capital172. In complement, by analyzing the company’s financial 
statements, it is also possible to perceive the significant impact of the acquisition on 
Amazon’s revenue. In the year of 2018, its physical stores were already contributing 
for 7.4% of the company’s total revenue (a superior contribution from the one 
generated by its subscription services, for example)173. Also, as per in its 2018 annual 
report, its Net Sales in North America increased from $106,110 million, in 2017, to 
$141,366 million, in 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
172 In this respect, we highlight the fact that, in the beginning of this time window, Amazon’s higher levels of 
ROE were triggered mainly due to its higher leverage and asset turnover. Nevertheless, since the second quarter 
of 2018, the company also started to deliver higher net margin (in comparison to its peers), factor that also 
contributed to explain the rationales for Amazon’s superior ROE. 
173 See Annex – 11. Amazon’s Segments. 
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6. Conclusion 
The food industry is a large, increasingly competitive one, and in the past few 
years, we were able to observe a profound change in customers’ patterns of demand. 
In this sense, the merger with WFM allowed Amazon the combination of 
complementary capabilities and higher growth in new and existing markets. Firstly, 
we highpoint the fact that through the deal Amazon would be able to expand its 
physical presence. This key factor would enable the company not only to fulfil its 
long‐standing commitment of fast‐delivering services (and simultaneously take 
control of the “last‐mile” of distribution), but also to use data from its customers’ in‐
store purchases to develop new ways of selling its products. Secondly, we highlight 
the fact that the acquisition took place at a moment that allows Amazon to profit 
from (and/or accelerate) the considerable growth of both online groceries retail, and 
organic‐food retail in the U.S. Even though Amazon’s delivery services are not 
unique (i.e. they can be replicated by a competitor), it is possible to conclude that the 
company’s expertise and reach can truly function as a competitive advantage.  
In order to compete with Amazon, other retailers were “obligated” to 
engage/reinforce their investments in their online segments (an opposite movement 
to the one implied in Amazon’s acquisition of WFM). Additionally, in our opinion, 
with the end of maintaining their competitiveness, “traditional” grocery retailers are 
also required to upgrade their technologies, collect more data about its customers, 
and include an extensive set of unique/private brands in their offering (in order to 
differentiate themselves). 
All factors considered, we argue that the acquisition perfectly fits in 
Amazon’s strategy. The acquisition of WFM allowed Amazon not only to empower 
its capabilities, but also to expand its ecosystem. However, we defend that this deal 
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could be just the first step of a long and costly process to Amazon. To achieve its 
ultimate goal of allying a strong physical presence with its online dominance, for the 
future we predict that the company will continue to acquire companies with 
complementary resources (and/or grow organically), in new or pre‐established 
segments. 
To conclude, we also recognize some gaps in our analysis that may be subject 
to further research. First, we suggest a profound quantitative approach of the 
acquisition, assessing the value of both companies at the time of the deal, and how 
the premium is divided between the value of the potential synergies and the value 
of control (enabling us, for example, to evaluate how the gains were distributed 
among the involved parts, or to infer if Amazon’s offer embeds, in fact, a fair price 
per WFM’s share). Second, a complementary analysis that could add interesting 
conclusions to our study would be the evaluation of the implications of the deal for 
other stakeholders, such as WFM’s bondholders, employees, and suppliers. 
Similarly, as referred above, in order to have a clear picture of deal’s value‐creation, 
one should also analyze competitors’ reactions to the deal, assessing the investments 
made by WFM’s competitors as a response to Amazon’s entrance in the food 
industry. Third, we also propose the evaluation of Amazon’s active M&A strategy 
on its performance/returns in the past years (assessing if Amazon’s strategy is 
indeed a profitable one, and if Amazon’s stock price embeds any premium related 
to its success in M&A). 
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Appendix 
1. Summary of the acquisition’s key aspects 
Parties Amazon.com, Inc.; Whole Foods Market, Inc.; Walnut Merger Sub, Inc. 
Motives Fast entrance in the organic food industry; Expand Amazon’s distribution 
channels; Learning about customers’ “offline” behavior. 
Market’s 
reactions 
At the announcement, on June 16th, 2017, Amazon’s and Whole Foods 
Market’s stock price went up by approximately 25.54% and 2.41%, 
respectively (compared to their stock prices one day prior to the 
announcement). On the other hand, Whole Foods Market’s competitors, 
such as Walmart, Target and Sprouts Farmers experienced negative 
returns during the same time window (‐4.76%, ‐5.28%, and ‐6.50%, 
respectively). Additionally, considering the time window from 10 trading‐
days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to 10 trading‐days after 
its announcement, the acquisition generated a cumulative‐abnormal‐
return of 18.85% and 0.42% to Whole Foods Market and Amazon, 
respectively. 
Financing To finance the acquisition, Amazon entered into a commitment letter with 
Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Goldman Sachs Lending Partners LLC, Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, and Bank of America, N.A., 
in order to obtain a 364‐day senior unsecured bridge term loan, summing 
a principal amount of $13.7 bn. Next, to fulfill its responsibilities towards 
the initial financing, Amazon choose to sell debt, totaling $16 bn. across 7 
tranches.  
Payment 
method 
Amazon opted for paying entirely with cash. 
Offer $42 per Whole Foods Market’s share, which implied a premium equal to 
17.61% (when compared to WFM’s stock price at the first contact between 
the two companies), and an estimated total consideration of 
$13,571,748,138 ($14,755,452,138, including Amazon’s total fee and Whole 
Foods Market’s long‐term debt). 
Fees Whole Foods Market paid a total fee equal to $45 million, while Amazon 
paid a total fee equal to $25.704 million (0.33% and 0.19%, respectively, 
when compared to the total consideration). 
Merger Whole Foods Market was incorporated into Amazon through a reverse 
triangular merger. The organic food chain merged with Walnut Merger 
Sub (the special‐purpose‐vehicle) and continued to exist. As a result of this 
operation, WFM became a subsidiary to Amazon. Additionally, Whole 
Foods Market was delisted from NASDAQ and deregistered under the 
Exchange Act. 
 Table A.1: Summary of the acquisition’s key aspects. 
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2. Companies’ historical stock prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph A.1: Whole Foods Market’s historical stock prices, from April 2017 to the conclusion 
of the deal. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database 
 
Graph A.2: Amazon’s historical stock prices, from April 2017 to the conclusion of the deal. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database  
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3. Multiples Valuation of Whole Foods Market 
In order to enable us to assess the fairness of Amazon’s offer, we conducted 
a multiple valuation of Whole Foods Market’s enterprise value and price per share 
on the closest moment (depending on the available data) preceding the 
announcement of the deal. Following DePamphilis (2015), multiple valuation 
“involves valuing assets based on how similar assets are valued in the marketplace. 
Such methods assume a firm’s market value can be approximated by a value 
indicator for comparable companies, comparable transactions, or comparable 
industry averages.” In addition, following Liu et al. (2002), “multiple approach relies 
on the same principles underlying the more comprehensive approach: value is an 
increasing function of future payoffs”. As main advantages of this methodology we 
point out its simplicity (not only to compute, but also to be interpreted) when 
compared to discounted cash‐flows methods, and the fact that it is more likely to 
reflect the current market conditions.  
Based on the vast literature about multiple valuation (see Koller et al. (2010), 
and Damodaran (2002)), we decided to evaluate Whole Foods Market’s enterprise 
value and stock price based on four multiples, namely:  
 Enterprise Value Multiples: Enterprise Value / 12 Months Forward EBITDA and 
Enterprise Value / 12 Months Forward Sales; 
 Equity Multiples: Dividend‐Yield and Price‐to‐Book Value of Equity. 
  /12             =  
                        
12     ℎ                
; 
 
  /12            =  
                        
12     ℎ               
; 
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 ℎ         
; 
 
                              =  
                            ℎ   
                          ℎ   
. 
 
Based on Liu et al. (2002; 2007) and Koller et al. (2010), we opted to include 
forward‐looking multiples in our analysis. As per the work developed by the 
authors, multiples valuations derived from these measures tend to outperform (i.e. 
are more accurate) those derived from historical measures. 
In the group of peers we decided to include not only grocery chains that focus 
mainly on organic products, but also some mass retailers. Concretely, we selected 
the following peers: Walmart, Inc.; Kroger, Co; Target, Corp.; Costco Wholesale, 
Corp.; Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc.; and Ingles Markets, Inc.  
Resorting to Thompson Reuters Eikon Database, we collected the following 
data concerning the multiples of Whole Foods Markets’ peers: 
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 EV / 12M 
FWD 
EBITDA 
EV / 12M 
FWD Sales 
Dividend‐
Yield (%) 
Price‐to‐Book 
Value of 
Equity 
Walmart 8.432 0.556 2.58 2.99 
Kroger 6.946 0.351 1.59 3.79 
Target 6.05 0.563 4.39 2.53 
Costco 14.244 0.608 1.1 7.36 
Sprout Farmers 11.607 0.785 0 4.92 
Ingles 6.572 0.402 1.84 1.42 
Average1 8.975 0.544 1.917 3.835 
Table A.2: Peer’s group multiples. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database (data from June 8th, 2017). 
1 Approximated values. 
   
Also, resorting to Thompson Reuters Eikon Database, we also collected the 
following data related to Whole Foods Market:  
 12M FWD EBITDA: $1,310,433; 
 12 FWD Sales: $16.289.050; 
 Annual Dividend per share: $0.72; 
 Book Value of Equity per share: $10.80625. 
 
Lastly, using the information provided above and peer’s average for each 
multiple, we were able to compute Whole Foods Market’s implied enterprise value 
and share price on June 8th, 2017. 
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4. Cumulative‐Abnormal‐Returns (CARs) 
 Despite the fact that our approach differs from an “event study 
methodology”, in order to deepen our understanding about the impacts of the 
acquisition on both companies’ returns, we compute (using data from the Thompson 
Reuters Eikon Database) the cumulative‐abnormal‐returns (CARs) for the periods: 
(1) from T‐10 to T+10; and (2) from T‐49 to T+10 (T=0 represents the date in which 
the deal was announced). The first time window will give us a closer look on the 
impact of the announcement of the acquisition. The second will give us useful 
insights concerning the impacts on both companies’ returns from the moment in 
which Whole Foods Markets demonstrated interest in being acquired, enabling us 
to understand if there are any sings of anticipation, by the market, concerning a 
potential restructuring operation. The general idea is to try to isolate the impact of 
the acquisition from other general market movements during the period in 
consideration. 
The first step to compute a company’s Abnormal Returns (ARi,T), defined as 
the difference between the Actual Returns (Ri,T) and the Expected Returns (E[Ri,T]), 
is to compute the Actual Returns for both companies we used the following formula: 
  ,  = ln (
  , 
  ,   
),   
where Ri,T denotes the daily stock return of company i, on day T; and Pi,T denotes the 
stock price of company i, on day T. 
 Then, to compute the Expected Returns, and assuming a constant and linear 
relation between a company’s stock returns and the returns of a market index, we 
used the following formula: 
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 [  , ] =     +     ∗   , , 
where E[Ri,T] denotes the expected daily stock return of company i’s, on day T; αi 
denotes the intercept; βi denotes the slope; and RM,T denotes the daily stock return 
from NASDAQ 100 Index, on day T. 
 With the results obtained, we next computed the CARs using:  
   (  ,  ) =  ∑    , 
  
     , 
where CAR(t1,t2) denotes the cumulative abnormal return for the time period between 
t1 and t2; and ARi,T denotes the daily abnormal stock return of company i, on day T. 
Also, Amazon’s average abnormal return for the next 20 trading‐days after 
the announcement (“average supernormal return”) equals 0.088%. However, 
following Bruner (2004), “M&A event returns must be annualized to compare them 
to other rates of return that investors experience”. Therefore, considering that the 
NASDAQ 100 Index has 253 trading‐days each year, the Amazon’s “average 
supernormal return” corresponds (theoretically) to a return of 24.92%, in annual 
terms. 
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Annex 
1. Whole Foods Market’s and Amazon’s financial statements 
 2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Revenue 15,389 15,724 16,030 
Net Sales 15,389 15,724 16,030 
Other Revenue, Total ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total Revenue 15,389 15,724 16,030 
Cost of Revenue, Total 9,973 10,313 10,633 
Gross Profit 5,416 5,411 5,397 
    
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses, Total 4,539 4,541 4,687 
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses 4,477 4,494 4,654 
Labor & Related Expense 62 47 33 
Research & Development ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Depreciation/Amortization ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Unusual Expense (Income) 16 13 251 
Other Operating Expenses, Total ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total Operating Expense 14,528 14,867 15,571 
Operating Income 861 857 459 
Interest Inc. (Exp), Net‐Non‐Op., Total 17 (30) (42) 
Interest Expense, Net Non‐Operating ‐ (41) (49) 
Interest Income – Non‐Operating ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Investment Income – Non‐Operating 17 11 7 
Other Non‐Operating Income (Expense) ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Net Income Before Taxes 878 827 417 
Provision for Income Taxes 342 320 172 
Net Income After Taxes 536 507 245 
Equity in Affiliates ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Net Income Before Extra. Items 536 507 245 
Total Extraordinary Items ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Net Income 536 507 245 
Table B.1: Whole Foods Market’s Income Statement ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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  2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Revenue 107,006 135,987 177,866 232,887 
Net Sales 107,006 135,987 177,866 232,887 
Other Revenue, Total ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total Revenue 107,006 135,987 177,866 232,887 
Cost of Revenue, Total 71,651 88,265 111,934 139,156 
Gross Profit 35,355 47,722 65,932 93,731 
     
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses, Total 20,411 27,284 38,992 52,177 
Selling/General/Admin. Expenses 19,516 25,989 37,129 49,720 
Labor & Related Expense 895 1,295 1,863 2,457 
Research & Development 12,540 16,085 22,620 28,837 
Depreciation/Amortization 1,381 1,716 2,678 ‐ 
Unusual Expense (Income) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Other Operating Expenses, Total (1,210) (1,549) (2,464) 296 
Total Operating Expense 104,773 131,801 173,760 220,466 
Operating Income 2,233 4,186 4,106 12,421 
Interest Inc. (Exp), Net‐Non‐Op., Total (680) (371) (406) (977) 
Interest Expense, Net Non‐Operating (459) (484) (848) (1,417) 
Interest Income – Non‐Operating 50 100 202 440 
Investment Income – Non‐Operating (271) 13 240 ‐ 
Other Non‐Operating Income (Expense) 15 77 106 (183) 
Net Income Before Taxes 1,568 3,892 3,806 11,261 
Provision for Income Taxes 950 1,425 1,558 1,354 
Net Income After Taxes 618 2,467 2,248 9,907 
Equity in Affiliates (22) (96) (4) 9 
Net Income Before Extra. Items 596 2,371 2,244 9,916 
Total Extraordinary Items ‐ ‐ 789 157 
Net Income 596 2,371 3,033 10,073 
Table B.2: Amazon’s Income Statement ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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  2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Cash and Short Term Investments 392 730 826 
Cash & Equivalents 237 351 322 
Short Term Investments 155 379 504 
Total Receivables, Net 218 242 366 
Accounts Receivable – Trade, Net 218 242 242 
Receivables – Other ‐ ‐ 124 
Total Inventory 500 517 417 
Prepaid Expenses 108 167 143 
Other Current Assets, Total 326 319 339 
Total Current Assets 1,544 1,975 2,145 
    
Property/Plant/Equipment, Total, Net 3,163 3,442 3,514 
Property/Plant/Equipment, Total, Gross 5,854 6,414 6,797 
Accumulated Depreciation (2,691) (2,972) (3,283) 
Goodwill, Net 710 710 710 
Intangibles, Net 79 74 68 
Intangibles – Gross 129 129 126 
Accumulated Intangible Amortization (50) (55) (58) 
Long Term Investments 63 0 121 
Other Long Term Assets, Total 182 140 118 
Total Assets 5,741 6,341 6,676 
Table B.3: Whole Foods Market’s Total Assets ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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  2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Accounts Payable 295 307 371 
Accrued Expenses 436 407 397 
Current Port. Of LT Debt/Capital Leases 3 3 2 
Other Current Liabilities, Total 518 624 585 
Total Current Liabilities 1,252 1,341 1,355 
    
Total Long Term Debt 62 1,048 1,081 
Long Term Debt 62 1,048 1,081 
Capital Lease Obligations ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Deferred Income Tax ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Other Liabilities, Total 658 728 810 
Total Liabilities 1,972 3,117 3,246 
    
Common Stock, Total 2,904 2,933 2,972 
Additional Paid‐In Capital ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) 2,017 2,349 496 
Treasury Stock – Common (1,124) (2,026) 0 
Unrealized Gain (Loss) ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Other Equity, Total (28) (32) (38) 
Translation Adjustment  ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Other Comprehensive Income (28) (32) (38) 
Total Equity 3,769 3,224 3,430 
    
Total Liabilities & Shareholders’ Equity 5,741 6,341 6,676 
Table B.4: Whole Foods Market’s Total Liabilities & Shareholders’ Equity ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Cash and Short Term Investments 19,808 25,981 30,986 41,250 
Cash & Equivalents 15,890 19,334 20,522 31,750 
Short Term Investments 3,918 6,647 10,464 9,500 
Total Receivables, Net 5,654 8,339 13,164 16,677 
Accounts Receivable – Trade, Net 5,654 8,339 13,164 16,677 
Receivables – Other ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total Inventory 10,243 11,461 16,047 17,174 
Prepaid Expenses ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Other Current Assets, Total ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total Current Assets 35,705 45,781 60,197 75,101 
     
Property/Plant/Equipment, Total, Net 21,838 29,114 48,866 61,797 
Property/Plant/Equipment, Total, Gross 30,053 42,441 68,573 95,770 
Accumulated Depreciation (8,215) (13,327) (19,707) (33,973) 
Goodwill, Net 3,759 3,784 13,350 14,548 
Intangibles, Net 992 854 3,371 4,110 
Intangibles – Gross 1,847 1,900 4,422 5,350 
Accumulated Intangible Amortization (855) (1,046) (1,051) (1,240) 
Long Term Investments ‐ 242 415 518 
Other Long Term Assets, Total 2,453 3,627 5,111 6,574 
Total Assets 64,747 83,402 131,310 162,648 
Table B.5: Amazon’s Total Assets ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Accounts Payable 20,397 25,309 34,616 38,192 
Accrued Expenses 10,372 8,542 11,949 14,161 
Current Port. Of LT Debt/Capital Leases ‐ 5,197 6,221 9,502 
Other Current Liabilities, Total 3,118 4,768 5,097 6,536 
Total Current Liabilities 33,887 43,816 57,883 68,391 
     
Total Long Term Debt 14,175 15,213 37,926 39,787 
Long Term Debt 8,227 7,694 24,743 23,495 
Capital Lease Obligations 5,948 7,519 13,183 16,292 
Deferred Income Tax 407 392 990 1,490 
Other Liabilities, Total 2,894 4,696 6,802 9,431 
Total Liabilities 51,363 64,117 103,601 119,099 
     
Common Stock, Total 5 5 5 5 
Additional Paid‐In Capital 13,394 17,186 21,389 26,791 
Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) 2,545 4,916 8,636 19,625 
Treasury Stock – Common (1,837) (1,837) (1,837) (1,837) 
Unrealized Gain (Loss) (1) 16 (16) ‐ 
Other Equity, Total (722) (1,001) (468) (1,035) 
Translation Adjustment  (722) (1,001) (468) ‐ 
Other Comprehensive Income ‐ ‐ ‐ (1,035) 
Total Equity 13,384 19,285 27,709 43,549 
     
Total Liabilities & Shareholders’ Equity 64,747 83,402 131,310 162,648 
Table B.6: Amazon’s Total Liabilities & Shareholders’ Equity ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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 2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Net Income 536 507 245 
Depreciation 439 498 495 
Deferred Taxes (43) 47 8 
Non‐Cash Items 156 98 272 
Changes in Working Capital 41 (34) 118 
Accounts Receivable (21) (24) 0 
Inventories (61) (11) 42 
Prepaid Expenses (9) (59) 14 
Accounts Payable 20 13 63 
Accrued Expenses 58 (29) (10) 
Other Liabilities 54 76 9 
Cash from Operating Activities 1,129 1,116 1,138 
Table B.7: Whole Foods Market’s Cash from Op. Activities ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
 
  2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Capital Expenditures (854) (718) (646) 
Purchase of Fixed Assets (851) (716) (646) 
Purchase/Acquisition of Intangibles 3 2 0 
Other Investing Cash Flow Items, Total 399 (177) (260) 
Acquisition of Business 4 11 0 
Sale of Fixed Assets ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Sale/Maturity of Investment  928 431 712 
Purchase of Investments  (494) (593) (959) 
Other Investing Cash Flow (31) (4) (13) 
Cash from Investing Activities (455) (895) (906) 
Table B.8: Whole Foods Market’s Cash from Investing Activities ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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 2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Financing Cash Flow Items 9 4 121 
Total Cash Dividends Paid (184) (177) (190) 
Issuance (Retirement) of Stock, Net (447) (925) 49 
Sale/Issuance of Common 66 19 51 
Repurchase/Retirement of Common (513) (944) (2) 
Common Stock, Net (447) (925) 49 
Issuance (Retirement) of Debt, Net ‐ 993 (3) 
Long Term Debt Issued ‐ 1,299 0 
Long Term Debt Reduction ‐ (306) (3) 
Long Term Debt, Net ‐ 993 (3) 
Cash From Financing Activities (622) (113) (265) 
Table B.9: Whole Foods Market’s Cash from Financing Activities ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
 
 2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Cash from Operating Activities 1,129 1,116 1,138 
Cash from Investing Activities (455) (895) (906) 
Cash from Financing Activities (622) (113) (265) 
    
Foreign Exchange Effects (5) 6 6 
Net Change in Cash 47 114 (27) 
    
Net Cash – Beginning Balance 190 237 473 
Net Cash – Ending Balance 237 351 446 
Cash Interest Paid ‐ 27 52 
Cash Taxes Paid 383 377 192 
    
Free Cash Flow 275 398 492 
Table B.10: Whole Foods Market’s Cash Flows ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Net Income 596 2,371 3,033 10,073 
Depreciation 6,281 8,116 11,478 15,341 
Deferred Taxes 81 (246) (29) 441 
Non‐Cash Items 2,524 3,115 4,125 5,911 
Changes in Working Capital 2,557 3,847 (242) (1,043) 
Accounts Receivable (1,755) (3,436) (4,780) (4,615) 
Inventories (2,187) (1,426) (3,583) (1,314) 
Prepaid Expenses ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Accounts Payable 4,294 5,030 7,100 3,263 
Accrued Expenses 913 1,724 283 472 
Other Liabilities 1,292 1,955 738 1,151 
Cash from Operating Activities 12,039 17,203 18,365 30,723 
Table B.11: Amazon’s Cash from Op. Activities ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Capital Expenditures (5,387) (7,804) (11,955) (13,427) 
Purchase of Fixed Assets (5,387) (7,804) (11,955) (13,427) 
Purchase/Acquisition of Intangibles ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Other Investing Cash Flow Items, Total (1,063) (1,712) (15,129) 1,058 
Acquisition of Business (795) (116) (13,972) (2,186) 
Sale of Fixed Assets 798 1,067 1,897 2,104 
Sale/Maturity of Investment  3,025 4,577 9,677 8,240 
Purchase of Investments  (4,091) (7,240) (12,731) (7,100) 
Other Investing Cash Flow ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Cash from Investing Activities (6,450) (9,516) (27,084) (12,369) 
Table B.12: Amazon’s Cash from Investing Activities ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Financing Cash Flow Items ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total Cash Dividends Paid ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Issuance (Retirement) of Stock, Net ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Sale/Issuance of Common ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Repurchase/Retirement of Common ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Common Stock, Net ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Issuance (Retirement) of Debt, Net (3,882) (3,716) 9,928 (7,686) 
Long Term Debt Issued 353 618 16,228 768 
Long Term Debt Reduction (4,235) (4,334) (6,300) (8,454) 
Long Term Debt, Net (3,882) (3,716) 9,928 (7,686) 
Cash From Financing Activities (3,882) (3,716) 9,928 (7,686) 
Table B.13: Amazon’s Cash from Financing Activities ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
 
  2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Cash from Operating Activities 12,039 17,203 18,365 30,723 
Cash from Investing Activities (6,450) (9,516) (27,084) (12,369) 
Cash from Financing Activities (3,882) (3,716) 9,928 (7,686) 
     
Foreign Exchange Effects (374) (212) 713 (351) 
Net Change in Cash 1,333 3,759 1,922 10,317 
     
Net Cash – Beginning Balance 14,557 16,175 19,934 21,856 
Net Cash – Ending Balance 15,890 19,934 21,856 32,173 
Cash Interest Paid 325 290 328 854 
Cash Taxes Paid 273 412 957 1,184 
     
Free Cash Flow 6,652 9,399 6,410 17,296 
Table B.14: Amazon’s Cash Flows ($ Millions). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
Note: The table above contains information from the standardized financial statements as provided 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. Additionally, in the same database it was also provided 
complementary information that allow us to better understand how each line is computed and how 
the company is performing in additional aspects. 
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Whole Foods Market’s financial results have been included in Amazon’s 
consolidated financial statements from the date of the acquisition (August 28th, 
2017). The aggregate net sales and operating loss of WFM consolidated into 
Amazon’s financial statements, since the date of acquisition, was $5.8 bn. and ($24) 
million for the year ended December 31, 2017.  
 
Additional Information:  
 2015 2016 2017 
Period End Date 27‐Sep‐2015 25‐Sep‐2016 24‐Sep‐2017 
Comparable Store Sales 2.5% (2.5%) (1.5%) 
Change in transactions 0.8% (2.6%) (2.4%) 
Change in basket size 1.7% 0.1% 0.9% 
Total Revenue ($ Million) 15,389 15,724 16,030 
Gross Profit / Revenue 35.19% 34.41% 33.67% 
Op. Income / Gross Profit 15.90% 15.84% 8.5% 
Op. Return on Sales  5.59% 5.45% 2.86% 
Net Income Margin  3.48% 3.22% 1.53% 
Return on Total Assets  9.33% 8.39% 3.76% 
Return on Comm. Equity  14.14% 14.5% 7.36% 
Return on Invested Capital  11.9% 10.7% 4.7% 
Reinvestment Rate  9.23% 9.52% 2.92% 
Diluted Earnings‐per‐Share ($) 1.48 1.55 ‐1 
Table B.15: Whole Foods Market – Additional Information. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
1 Diluted Earnings‐per‐Share 9‐months ended: 0.94 
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 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Period End Date 31‐Dec‐2015 31‐Dec‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2018 
Online Sales ($ Million) 76,863 91,431 108,354 122,987 
Retail Sales ($ Million) ‐ ‐ 5,798 17,224 
Total Revenue ($ Million) 107,006 135,987 177,866 232,887 
Gross Profit / Revenue 33.04% 35.09% 37.07% 40.25% 
Op. Income / Gross Profit 6.32% 8.77% 6.23% 13.25% 
Op. Return on Sales 2.09% 3.08% 2.31% 5.33% 
Net Income Margin 0.56% 1.74% 1.71% 4.33% 
Return on Total Assets  1.04% 3.33% 2.09% 6.74% 
Return on Comm. Equity 4.94% 14.52% 9.55% 27.83% 
Return on Invested Capital 2.2% 7.00% 4.00% 11.80% 
Reinvestment Rate 4.94% 14.52% 9.55% 27.83% 
Diluted Earnings‐per‐Share ($) 1.25 4.90 6.151 20.14 
Table B.16: Amazon – Additional Information. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
1 The results of Whole Foods Market have been included in Amazon’s results of operation from the 
date of acquisition. 
 
 Further, the acquisition of Whole Foods Market was allocated on Amazon’s 
annual reports as follows ($, in million): 
 Purchase Price (net of cash acquired): 13,176; 
 Allocation:  
o Goodwill: 9,010;  
o Intangible assets: 2,335;  
o Property and equipment: 3,794; 
o Deferred tax assets: 95; 
o Other assets acquired: 1,711; 
o Long‐term debt: (1,158); 
o Deferred tax liabilities: (925); 
o Other liabilities assumed: (1686). 
Also, according to Amazon’s annual report, from 2017, the acquisition’s 
related costs were expensed as incurred. 
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2. Amazon’s M&A deals 
Graph B.1: Amazon’s M&A deals, from 2014 to 2018. 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database 
Note: During the same time period, Amazon’s average (median) deal size was $777.912 million 
($27.667 million). 
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Graph B.2: Amazon’s number of M&A deals per industry, from 2014 to 2018. 
          Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database 
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3. M&A activity in the recent past 
     Graph B.3: Trends in M&A, from 1998 to 2017. 
     Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
 
 
   Graph B.4: The S&P 500 Index and Net M&A announcements by quarter, form 2013 to 2017. 
   Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
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    Graph B.5: Prime Interest Rate and Net M&A announcements by quarter, from 2013 to 2017. 
    Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
 
       Graph B.6: Net M&A announcements: monthly breakdown by value, in 2017. 
       Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
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   Graph B.7: Net M&A announcements purchase price distribution, from 2008 to 2017. 
   Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
 
 
   Graph B.8: Payment trends in M&A, from 1998 to 2017. 
   Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
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Graph B.9: Percent premium offered, from 2008 to 2017. 
Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
 
 
Graph B.10: Deal value composition, in 2017. 
Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
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       Graph B.11: Method of payment composition for deals above $1 billion, in 2017. 
       Source: Mergerstat Review 2018 
 
4. Amazon’s Prime Members among Whole Foods Market’s 
customers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Graph B.12: Amazon’s Prime Members among Whole Foods Market’s customers. 
                     Source: Second Measure 
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5. Whole Foods Market’s Key Indicators 
 Industry 
Median 
2015 2016 2017 
Same Store Sales 
1Y Growth 
‐ 2.50% 
(1.8%) 
(2.50%) 
(5.0%) 
(1.5%) 
1.0% 
Gross Profit Margin 
1Y Growth 
80% 35.2% 
(0.3%) 
34.4% 
(0.8%) 
33.7% 
(0.7%) 
EBITDA Margin 
1Y Growth 
42.3% 8.6% 
(0.7%) 
8.7% 
0.1% 
7.9% 
(0.8%) 
Operating Margin 
1Y Growth 
42.3% 5.6% 
(1.0%) 
5.5% 
(0.1%) 
2.9% 
(2.6%) 
Pretax Margin 
1Y Growth 
36.5% 5.7% 
(1.0%) 
5.3% 
(0.4%) 
2.6% 
(2.7%) 
Effective Tax Rate 
1Y Growth 
21.0% 39.0% 
0.2% 
38.7% 
(0.3%) 
41.2% 
2.5% 
Net Margin 
1Y Growth 
28.6% 3.5% 
(0.6%) 
3.2% 
(0.3%) 
1.5% 
(1.7%) 
Asset Turnover 
1Y Growth 
‐ 2.68 
6.5% 
2.60 
(2.9%) 
2.46 
(5.4%) 
Pretax ROA 
1Y Growth 
‐ 15.3% 
(1.5%) 
13.7% 
(1.6%) 
6.4% 
(7.3%) 
Pretax ROE 
1Y Growth 
13.0% 23.2% 
(1.4%) 
23.7% 
0.5% 
12.5% 
(11.2%) 
x Tax Complement 
1Y Growth 
0.79 0.61 
(0.3%) 
0.61 
0.4% 
0.59 
(4.2%) 
ROE 
1Y Growth 
10.8% 14.1% 
(1.0%) 
14.5% 
0.4% 
7.4% 
(7.1%) 
x Earnings Retention 
1Y Growth 
0.70 0.65 
(6.2%) 
0,66 
0.6% 
0.40 
(39.7%) 
Reinvestment Rate 
1Y Growth 
7.6% 9.2% 
(1.3%) 
9.5% 
0.3% 
2.9% 
(6.6%) 
ROIC 
1Y Growth 
‐ 11.9% 
(1.1%) 
10.7% 
(1.2%) 
4.7% 
(6.0%) 
Cash Cycle (Days) 
1Y Growth 
(4.5) 11.7 
1.0% 
12.6 
8.4% 
12.2 
(3.5%) 
Assets/Equity 
1Y Growth 
8.71 1.52 
1.1% 
1.97 
29.1% 
1.95 
(1.0%) 
Debt/Equity 
1Y Growth 
0.13 0.02 
6.1% 
0.33 
>99% 
0.32 
(3.1%) 
% LT Debt to Total Capital 
1Y Growth 
1.5% 1.6% 
0.1% 
24.5% 
22.9% 
24.0% 
(0.5%) 
(Total Debt‐ Cash)/EBITDA 
1Y Growth 
(0.37) ‐ 
‐ 
‐ 
‐ 
0.23 
. 
Table B.17: Whole Foods Market’s Key Indicators (annually). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
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6. Interests of Whole Foods Market’s Directors and Executive 
Officers in the merger 
Golden Parachute Compensation 
Name  Cash 
($) 
Equity 
($) 
Perquisites/Benefits 
($) 
Total 
($) 
John Mackey ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Walter E. Robb, IV ‐ 55,760 ‐ 55,760 
Glenda Flanagan 2,571,423 525,765 4,158 3,101,346 
Keith Manbeck 3,241,667 540,200 ‐ 3,781,867 
A.C. Gallo 2,571,423 1,236,186 17,478 3,825,086 
David Lannon 2,571,423 382,710 13,338 2,967,471 
Jason Buechel 5,705,635 529,957 4,680 6,240,272 
Table B.18: Interests of Whole Foods Market’s Directors and Executive Officers in the merger (1). 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
 
Name Severance 
Payment 
($) 
Prorated Annual 
Bonus Payment 
($) 
Accelerated Non-
Compete Payment 
($) 
Glenda Flanagan 2,420,453 150,970 ‐ 
A.C. Gallo 2,420,453 150,970 ‐ 
David Lannon 2,420,453 150,970 ‐ 
Jason Buechel 2,354,665 150,970 3,200,000 
Table B.19: Interests of Whole Foods Market’s Directors and Executive Officers in the merger (2). 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
 
Name Company Stock 
Options 
($) 
Company 
Restricted Stock 
Awards 
($) 
Company 
Restricted Stock 
Unit Awards 
 ($) 
John Mackey ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Walter E. Robb, IV 55,760 ‐ ‐ 
Glenda Flanagan 313,077 212,688 ‐ 
Keith Manbeck 120,200 ‐ 420,000 
A.C. Gallo 72,744 1,163,442 ‐ 
David Lannon 170,022 212,688 ‐ 
Jason Buechel 479,725 50,232 ‐ 
Table B.20: Interests of Whole Foods Market’s Directors and Executive Officers in the merger (3). 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
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Whole Foods Market’s directors and executive officers were entitled to vote 
approximately 3,132,711 share of common stock (approximately 1.0% of the shares 
of common stock issued and outstanding on that date).  
Amazon agreed to pay 2017’s annual bonuses based on formulae previously 
established by Whole Foods Market and in a manner consistent with Whole Foods 
Market’s historical practices related to discretionary amounts, if the closing occurs 
prior to the time that the Whole Foods Market has paid annual bonuses. 
Certain Whole Foods Market’s executive officers would participate in a 
retention plan, providing them employment protections during the two years 
following the deal. Moreover, Whole Foods Market’s directors and executive officers 
were also entitled to continued indemnification and insurance coverage under 
indemnification agreements and the merger agreement (Whole Foods Market 
provided its shareholders with a separate advisory (non‐binding) vote to approve 
certain compensations that may be paid or become payable to its named executive 
officers in connection with the merger). For more details, see section “Whole Foods 
Market Executive Retention Plan and Non-Compete Arrangement”, of the definitive 
proxy statement concerning the acquisition. 
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7. Whole Foods Market’s Projections  
  
Summary of the Whole Foods Market’s Projections 
(dollars in millions) 
 2017 20183 2019 2020 2021 
Revenue 15,887 16,490 17,339 18,217 19,238 
EBITDA1 1,216 1,331 1,656 1,815 1,949 
Free Cash Flow2 324 422 639 738 814 
Table B.21: Whole Foods Market’s projections. 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
1 EBITDA is defined for purposes of the Whole Foods Market Projections as earnings before interest 
expense, investment and other income, income taxes and depreciation and amortization. This 
measure is different from measures determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP and may not be 
comparable to similar measures used by other companies and should not be considered as an 
alternative to operating income or net income as a measure of operating performance or cash flow or 
as a measure of liquidity. EBITDA in 2017 excludes charges incurred for a severance payment and 
store and facility closures. 
2 Free Cash Flow is defined for purposes of the Whole Foods Market Projections as net cash provided 
by operating activities less capital expenditures. 
3 Estimates in 2018, a 53‐week fiscal year, are presented on a 52‐week basis. 
 
 
Reconciliation of Projected EBITDA to Projected Net Income 
(dollars in millions) 
 20171 20182 2019 2020 2021 
Net Income 409 470 658 739 794 
Provision for 
income taxes 
262 300 420 473 507 
Interest expense 47 47 47 47 47 
Investment and 
other income 
(8) (14) (20) (29) (33) 
Operating income 710 803 1,105 1,230 1,315 
Depreciation and 
amortization 
506 528 551 585 634 
EBITDA 1,216 1,331 1,656 1,815 1,949 
Table B.22: Whole Foods Market’s projections – complementary information (1). 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
1 EBITDA in 2017 excludes charges incurred for a severance payment and store and facility closures. 
2 Estimates in 2018, a 53‐week fiscal year, are presented on a 52‐week basis. 
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Reconciliation of Projected Free Cash Flow to Projected Net Cash Provided by 
Operating activities 
(dollars in millions) 
 2017 20181 2019 2020 2021 
Net cash provided by 
operating activities  
1,019 1,079 1,293 1,420 1,532 
Development costs of 
new locations 
(370) (343) (340) (367) (402) 
Other property and 
equipment expenditures 
(325) (314) (314) (315) (316) 
Free Cash Flow 324 422 639 738 814 
Table B.23: Whole Foods Market’s projections – complementary information (2). 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
1 Estimates in 2018, a 53‐week fiscal year, are presented on a 52‐week basis. 
 
These projections constitute set of non‐public, unaudited financial forecasts 
with respect to Whole Foods Market’s business, as a standalone company (without 
considering the possible financial and other effects on the company of the merger, 
or its failure), that were presented to the company’s board of directors and its 
financial advisors. These projections are based on expectations regarding important 
risk factors and should not be regarded as a representation that the results expressed 
therein will be achieved. The definitive proxy statement also includes, in the section 
“Cautionary Statement concerning Forward-Looking Statement”, several factors that 
could cause the results to differ materially from those presented above. 
 As presented on Form 10‐Q (filed by Whole Foods Market on February 16th, 
2017), for the fiscal year 2017, Whole Foods Market was targeting: 
 Sales growth of 1.5%, or greater; 
 Comparable store sales of approximately ‐2.5%, or better; 
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 Ending square footage growth of approximately 5% net of closures, 
reflecting approximately 30 new stores, including up to six relocations and 3 
“365 Stores”; 
 Diluted EPS of $1.33, or greater; 
 EBITDA margin of approximately 8%; 
 Capital Expenditures of approximately 4% of sales; 
 ROIC of approximately 11%. 
Additionally, as presented by Whole Foods Market through the Form 8‐K (filled 
by the company, on May 10th, 2017), the company also expected to achieve, by FYE 
2020, the following targets: 
 Total sales of over $18 billion; 
 Comparable store sales growth greater than 2.0%; 
 Selling, General & Administrative Expenses as a percentage of sales less than 
27%; 
 EBITDA margin greater than 9.5%; 
 Cash‐flow from operations of over $1.2 billion; 
 Realizing $300 million in additional cost savings. 
 
8. Voting results from Whole Foods Market’s Special Meeting 
to approve the Merger Agreement 
Votes cast “FOR” Votes cast “Against” 
Number % of shares 
outstanding 
Number % of shares 
outstanding 
Abstain Broker non‐
votes 
229,534,195 71.68% 967,493 0.30% 708,524 41,447,539 
Table B.24: Voting results from Whole Foods Market’s Special Meeting to approve the Merger 
Agreement. 
Source: Form 8‐K filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on August 28th, 2017. 
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 At the Special Meeting, held on July 19th, 2017, a total of 272,657,751 Whole 
Foods Market’s shares, representing approximately 85.15% of the outstanding 
shares entitled to vote, were present in person or by proxy, constituting a quorum 
to conduct business. 
 
9. Aggregate number of securities to which the transaction 
applies 
Type of Security Number of Securities 
Shares of common stock outstanding 320,092,231 
Shares of common stock issuable 
pursuant to outstanding options with 
exercise prices below the per share 
merger consideration 
14,805,6871 
Shares of common stock issuable 
pursuant to outstanding stock 
appreciation rights with exercise prices 
below the per share merger 
consideration 
15,7502 
Shares of common stock representing 
restricted stock and restricted stock 
units entitled to receive the per share 
merger consideration 
101,733 
Table B.25: Aggregate number of securities to which the transaction applies, as in July 2nd, 2017. 
Source: Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filled by Whole Foods Market, Inc. on July 21st, 2017. 
1 Weighted average exercise price equal to $33.66. 
2 Weighted average exercise price equal to $34.24. 
 
The maximum number of securities to which the deal applies is estimated to 
be 335,015,401. The maximum aggregate value of acquisition is estimated to be 
$13,571,748,138, and results from the sum of: (a) the product of 320,092,231 shares of 
common stock and the per share merger consideration of $42.00; (b) the product of 
(i) 14,805,687 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of options to purchase 
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shares of common stock and (ii) the difference between $42.00 and the weighted 
average exercise price of such options of $33.66; (c) the product of (i) 15,750 shares 
of common stock issuable pursuant to stock appreciation rights and (ii) the 
difference between $42.00 and the weighted average exercise price of such stock 
appreciation rights of $34.24; and (d) the product of 101,733 shares of common stock 
representing restricted stock and restricted stock units and the per share merger 
consideration of $42.00. 
Amazon did not possess any WFM’s shares prior to the acquisition (toehold). 
Toehold is one way to mount a profitable bid, acquire some share at “discount” – 
i.e. without including a control premium, or the discounted value of future synergies 
– and can also allow a premium/compensation if the company loses the deal to 
another bidder. However, this strategy is rare nowadays and it is more common in 
hostile acquisitions. 
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10. Amazon’s Key Indicators 
 Industry 
Median 
2016 2017 2018 
# Stores 
1Y Growth 
‐ ‐ 472 
‐ 
527 
11.7% 
Gross Profit Margin 
1Y Growth 
27.6% 35.1% 
2.1% 
37.1% 
2.0% 
40.2% 
3.1% 
EBITDA Margin 
1Y Growth 
13.3% 9.0% 
1.0% 
8.8% 
(0.2%) 
10.7% 
1.9% 
Operating Margin 
1Y Growth 
9.4% 3.1% 
1.0% 
2.3% 
(0.8%) 
5.3% 
3.0% 
Pretax Margin 
1Y Growth 
6.2% 2.9% 
1.4% 
2.1% 
(0.8%) 
4.8% 
2.7% 
Effective Tax Rate 
1Y Growth 
24.5% 36.6% 
(24.0%) 
40.9% 
4.3% 
12.0% 
(28.9%) 
Net Margin 
1Y Growth 
4.6% 1.8% 
1.2% 
1.3% 
(0.5%) 
4.3% 
3.0% 
Asset Turnover 
1Y Growth 
1.01 1.84 
2.3% 
1.66 
(9.8%) 
1.58 
(4.4%) 
Pretax ROA 
1Y Growth 
5.6% 5.3% 
2.7% 
3.5% 
(1.8%) 
7.7% 
4.2% 
Pretax ROE 
1Y Growth 
11.1% 23.8% 
10.8% 
16.2% 
(7.6%) 
31.6% 
15.4% 
x Tax Complement 
1Y Growth 
0.87 0.61 
60.3% 
0.80 
30.8% 
0.89 
12.2% 
ROE 
1Y Growth 
12.8% 14.5% 
9.6% 
9.6% 
(4.9%) 
27.8% 
18.2% 
x Earnings Retention 
1Y Growth 
0.69 1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
1.00 
0.0% 
Reinvestment Rate 
1Y Growth 
5.6% 14.5% 
9.6% 
9.6% 
(4.9%) 
27.8% 
18.2% 
ROIC 
1Y Growth 
‐ 7.0% 
4.8% 
4.0% 
(3.0%) 
11.8% 
7.8% 
Cash Cycle (Days) 
1Y Growth 
48.2 (30.9) 
(12.5%) 
(30.9) 
0.2% 
(28.6) 
7.3% 
Assets/Equity 
1Y Growth 
2.15 4.32 
(10.6%) 
4.74 
9.6% 
3.73 
(21.2%) 
Debt/Equity 
1Y Growth 
0.54 1.06 
(0.1%) 
1.59 
50.5% 
1.13 
(29.0%) 
% LT Debt to Total Capital 
1Y Growth 
25.5% 38.3% 
(13.1%) 
52.8% 
14.5% 
42.9% 
(9.9%) 
(Total Debt‐ Cash)/EBITDA 
1Y Growth 
2.62 ‐ 0.24 
‐ 
0.42 
73.9% 
Table B.26: Amazon’s Post‐Acquisition Key Indicators (annually). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
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The deal also added a set of additional risks to Amazon. In brief, we highlight 
the following: loss of focus by its managers on existing businesses; potential 
impairment of customer and other relationships of WFM, or their own customers; 
unanticipated expenses related to integrations; additional specific risks associated 
with WFM’s business (which may differ from or be more significant than those from 
their businesses); unknown liabilities; and increasing competition, given that WFM’s 
competitors were experimenting click‐and‐collect programs and cashierless 
technology. 
 
11. Amazon’s Segments  
Segment Total Revenue per Segment 
(percentage of Amazon’s Total 
Revenue) 
Amazon Web Services $25,655,000,000 (11.02%) 
Online Stores $122,987,000,000 (52.81%) 
Other Services $10,108,000,000 (4.34%) 
Physical Stores $17,224,000,000 (7.4%) 
Subscription Services $14,168,000,000 (6.08%) 
Third Party Seller Services $42,745,000,000 (18.35%) 
  
Total $232,887,000,000 (100%) 
Table B.27: Amazon’s Revenue by Segment (2018). 
Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon Database. 
 
 
 
 
